ons dictated some of Roosevelt's diplomatic policies during the war. Cautious of provoking the British, he refrained from acting effectively against colonialism. Embarrassed by the delay in the second front--and anxious to secure Russian assistance against Japan--he acquiesced at the Teheran (1943) and Yalta (1945) summit conferences in some of Russia's aims in Asia and eastern Europe. In his dealings with Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Britain and Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, Roosevelt also showed an exaggerated faith in the power of his personal charm. The joviality and exuberance that had soothed ruffled congressmen and bureaucrats during the early New Deal days were not so well suited for international politics.In the larger sense Roosevelt's diplomacy, like his military policies, was statesmanlike. Despite occasional strains, the awkward wartime coalition among Russia, Britain, and the United States held together. Roosevelt was also wise in recognizing the futility of trying to stop Russian penetration of Eastern Europe, which Soviet armies had overrun by early 1944. Accordingly, he sought to avoid unnecessary bickering with Stalin. Had FDR lived into the postwar era, he could not have prevented divisions from developing between Russia and the United States. But he might have worked harder than did his successors in compromising them.As a war leader, F.D.R. picked an extraordinary team of generals and admirals. In partnership with Churchill, he presided over the vital strategic decisions. And also, in the footsteps of Wilson, he was determined that victory should produce a framework for lasting world peace. Roosevelt's military policies also provoked controversy. In 1941 critics blamed him for leaving Pearl Harbor unprepared. Extremists even claimed that he invited the Japanese attack in order to have a pretext for war. In 1943, FDR's opponents grumbled that his policy of unconditional surrender for the en...
