ernal aggression . . . . Even though this crisis passed, it set the stage for the next majorcrisis over Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and probably lead to theSoviets increasing their military support for Castro. In the administration itself, the Bay of Pigs crisis lead to a fewchanges. Firstly, someone had to take the blame for the affair and, asDirector of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles was forced to resign andleft CIA in November of 1961 Internally, the CIA was never the same,although it continued with covert operations against Castro, it was on amuch reduced scale. According to a report of the Select Senate Committee onIntelligence, future operations were ". . . to nourish a spirit ofresistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections andother by-products of unrest." The CIA also now came under the supervisionof the president's brother Bobby, the Attorney General. According to LucienS. Vandenbroucke, the outcome of the Bay of Pigs failure also made theWhite House suspicious of an operation that everyone agreed to, made themless reluctant to question the experts, and made them play "devil'sadvocates" when questioning them. In the end, the lessons learned from theBay of Pigs failure may have contributed to the successful handling of theCuban missile crisis that followed. The long term ramifications of the Bay of Pigs invasion are a littleharder to assess. The ultimate indication of the invasions failure is thatthirty-four years later Castro is still in power. This not only indicatesthe failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but American policy towards Cubain general. The American policy, rather than undermining Castro's support,has probably contributed to it. As with many wars, even a cold one, theleader is able to rally his people around him against an aggressor. When Castro came to power he instituted reforms to help the people andend corruption, no longer receiving help from the Soviet Union th...
