hips destroyed, and no command and controlship, the logistics of the operation soon broke down as the other supplyships were kept at bay by Casto's air force. As with many failed militaryadventures, one of the problems with this one was with supplying the troops. In the air, Castro had easily won superiority over the invading force.His fast moving T-33s, although unimpressive by today's standards, madeshort work of the slow moving B-26s of the invading force. On Tuesday, twowere shot out of the sky and by Wednesday the invaders had lost 10 of their12 aircraft. With air power firmly in control of Castro's forces, the endwas near for the invading army. Over the 72 hours the invading force of about 1500 men were pounded bythe Cubans. Casto fired 122mm. Howitzers, 22mm. cannon, and tank fire atthem. By Wednesday the invaders were pushed back to their landing zone atPlaya Girn. Surrounded by Castro's forces some began to surrender whileothers fled into the hills. In total 114 men were killed in the slaughterwhile thirty-six died as prisoners in Cuban cells. Others were to live outtwenty years or more in those cells as men plotting to topple thegovernment of Castro. The 1500 men of the invading force never had a chance for success fromalmost the first days in the planning stage of the operation. OperationPluto, as it came to be known as, has its origins in the last dying days ofthe Eisenhower administration and that murky time period during thetransition of power to the newly elected president John F. Kennedy. The origins of American policy in Latin America in the late 1950s andearly 1960s has its origins in American's economic interests and itsanticommunist policies in the region. The same man who had helped formulateAmerican containment policy towards the Soviet threat, George Kennan, in1950 spoke to US Chiefs of Mission in Rio de Janeiro about Latin America.He said that American policy had several purposes in the region, ...
