on the militaryside of the adventure. In the end, the CIA kept all the information foritself and passed on to the president only what it thought he should see.Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, in Political Science Quarterly of 1984, based hisanalysis of the Bay of Pigs failure on organizational behaviour theory. Hesays that the CIA ". . . supplied President Kennedy and his advisers withchosen reports on the unreliability of Castro's forces and the extent ofCuban dissent." Of the CIA's behaviour he concludes that, . . . By resorting to the typical organization strategy of defining the options and providing the information required to evaluate them, the CIA thus structured the problem in a way that maximized the likelihood the president would choose the agency's preferred option . . . .The CIA made sure the deck was stacked in their favour when the time cameto decide whether a project they sponsored was sound or not. PresidentKennedy's Secretary of State at the time was Dean Rusk, in hisautobiography he says that, . . . The CIA told us all sorts of things about the situation in Cuba and what would happen once the brigade got ashore. President Kennedy received information which simply was not correct. For example, we were told that elements of the Cuban armed forces would defect and join the brigade, that there would be popular uprisings throughout Cuba when the brigade hit the beach, and that if the exile force got into trouble, its members would simply melt into the countryside and become guerrillas, just as Castro had done . . . . As for senior White House aides, most of them disagreed with the planas well, but Rusk says that Kennedy went with what the CIA had to say. Asfor himself, he said that he ". . . did not serve President Kennedy verywell . . ." and that he should have voiced his opposition louder. Heconcluded that ". . . I should have made my opposition clear in themeet...
