f way which is peculiarly relevant to aesthetic value. The third factor in aesthetic response is thought to be disinterestedness. The idea is that the pleasurable experience of attending to something in perception should not consist in liking a thing only because it fulfills some definite function, satisfies a desire, or lives up to a prior standard or principle (4).There are subjective responses which we are justified in demanding from others: these are not idiosyncratic likes and dislikes, but deeply rooted in our common nature as experiencing subjects, and founded on a pleasurable response to the form of the object as it is presented in perception. This means, among other things, aesthetic value cannot be enshrined in learnable principles (5). There are no genuine aesthetic principles, because to find aesthetic value we must, get a look at the object with our own eyes (5). Aesthetic judgments are founded upon the slender basis of ones own feeling of pleasure, but can justifiably claim the universal agreement if the subjective response in question is one that which any properly equipped observer would have. Sometimes it is assumed that the prime interest in art is aesthetic, but that assumption bears some examination. Unless aesthetic stretches to cover everything conceivable that is of value in art, art may have values which are not aesthetic. For example, it might have therapeutic value, or give us moral insights, or help us understand points in history or points of view radically unlike our own. We might admire a work for its moral integrity, or despise it for its depravity or political untruthfulness. Are all these a matter of aesthetic value? If not, then aestheticism gives too narrow a view of the value of art. Without succumbing to the view that arts point is always as a means to some end outside itself (6), we should concede that works of art have a great variety of values. Artworks are, nevertheless, usually inten...
