e full stall that followed. Although it did not hamper the initial identification of the stall, the absence of a stick shaker warning may have been confusing for the flightcrew. The pilots training and experience would have made them expect a stick shaker cue during the period the airplane was in a stalled condition. They were trained to respond to the stick shaker by adding power and reducing control column back pressure until the stick shaker ceased. If the flightcrew had received the expected cues from the stick shaker as the airplane subsequently was flown farther into the stall, the PF may have responded with more aggressive stall recovery actions, and the PNF would have received a stronger signal to intervene. It is also possible the aircrew, during the stall recovery effort, gradually lost the perception that the airplane was stalled and may have been attempting to perform a high airspeed, nose-low unusual attitude recovery. In either instance this system being inoperative directly contributed to the accident by failing to reinforce to the flightcrew the indications that the airplane was in a full stall during the recovery attempt.10. This accident might have been prevented if the flightcrew had been provided a clear, direct indication of the airplanes angle of attack.The flight crew did not have a display of the airplanes angle of attack. This instrumen-tation would have provided a direct indication of the pitch attitudes required for recovery throughout the attempted stall recovery sequence. Without it the pilot has to rely on numerous other indicators to give him readings on the airplanes angle of attack which may or may not give him the correct indications. In response to another airplane accident, the FAA is currently evaluating the operational requirements for angle of attack instrumentation on transport-category aircraft. The Safety Board reiterates the recom-mendation it put forth before and I concur.12. The fl...
