, after slowing well below stall speed, the simulator entered a mode in which the aerodynamic buffet stopped and the airspeed did not continue to decrease. This was clearly not the fidelity level to which to aircrew should have trained. Moreover, the PF and PNF the airplane were exposed to extensive DC-8 simulator experience to what they presumed was the stall behavior of the DC-8. So when they experienced a different stall break in the airplane, it surprised them. The PF responded with what he had been trained but unfortunately in the airplane his control inputs didn't work.15. The accident could have been prevented if ABX had institutionalized and the flightcrew had used the revised functional evaluation flight stall recovery procedure agreed upon by ABX in 1991.On May 16, 1991 another ABX DC-8 experienced an in-flight loss of control during an FEF while recovering from a stall. The maneuver was begun at 13,000 feet and the flightcrew recovered at 7,000 feet. The PIC of the incident flight was the DC-8 flight standards manager at the time. As a follow-up to this incident, the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) and ABX agreed flightcrews would fly the FEF profile in the simulator before the actual evaluation flight; airborne maneuvers would be executed in an ATC-assigned altitude block depth ranging from 3,000 feet to 5,000 feet. Recovery was to be accomplished with pitch (lowering the nose), and power then slowly advanced to complete the recovery. The revised FEF stall recovery procedure stressed a positive reduction of pitch attitude to rapidly decrease the angle of attack below the critical stall angle before the application of engine power. In calling for a more positive reduction of pitch attitude, the revised procedure eliminated the emphasis of the standard ABX stall recovery procedure on minimum altitude loss. The principal operations inspector (POI) from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) recalled that at...
