ng the remainder of that decade despite questions about the profitability of such service. Most of the carriers lost money continuously from 1961 through 1973 and largely abandoned their all-cargo carriers (APO 114).The large jumbo jets purchased to compete in the passenger market did not contribute much revenue from hauling freight in their underbellies. The capacity in the bellies was so adequate that management of these airlines felt this was an efficient replacement for the space foregone by the abandonment of the all-cargo planes. Deep down, management was discounting freight and treating it as a by-product or appendage. These wide-body jets were designed first and foremost to serve passengers. Ironically, the enormous increase in size the jumbos represented had exactly the opposite Perry 4effect management sought. They made freight handling more difficult, not less (APO 125). Most airlines finally discouraged the small package business in the early 1970’s. They were not equipped to handle small packages. In fact, small packages were a headache, they were an unprofitably “dead weight” because the cost of shipments was considered high. What the airlines thought they wanted was freight weighing over 100 pounds, so they left the responsibility for handling small items to Emery and all of the other freight forwarders.The airlines had their troubles in the early 1970’s and the small package problem was not a particularly urgent one with most of them. Hundreds of flights were being canceled. Service as it had been known in the 1960’s had changed for a number of compelling reasons. First, the huge wide-bodied jets increased seating capacities so that flights were consolidated to increase economic efficiently, additionally, many flights were cut back to save money. Then the Arab oil embargo, and rising fuel costs, put a real scare in airlines in so far as their expense structures were co...
