Data Bases • Custom Term Papers • Free Term Papers • Free Research Papers • Free Essays • Free Book Reports • Plagiarism? Links • Top 100 Term Paper Sites • Top 25 Essay Sites • Top 50 Essay Sites • Search 97,000 Papers @ DirectEssays.com • Search 101,000 Papers @ ExampleEssays.com • Search 90,000 Papers @ MegaEssays.com Free Essays • Term Paper Sites • Chuck III's Free Essays • Free College Essays • TermPaperSites.com • My Term Papers • Get Free Essays • Essay World • Planet Papers	Search Lots of Essays Back to Subjects - Business Airline Safety Airline Safety In July of 1996, a Boeing 747 carrying the designator Flight 800 took off from Kennedy Airport in New York. On board were two hundred and thirty people who were entrusting their individual safety to an aircraft that had one of the best safety records in the airline industry. The Boeing 747 has been in service for many years, and has been utilized for many different things including the one designated Air Force One. Nine miles off the coast of Long Island the aircraft exploded, killing everybody on board (Adcock 08). The wreckage was strewn over a wide area of the Atlantic Ocean and proved to be very difficult to recover. It took several months to sift through the sand on the ocean floor and recover the parts from the aircraft. Speculation that the aircraft had somehow been the victim of a terrorist act was the topic of the day. There were theories that the aircraft had exploded as a result of a bomb placed aboard (Adcock 08). There were theories that it had been the victim of a ground to air missile or an air-to-air missile. There were investigations to find out if the Navy had inadvertently shot the aircraft down. Accusations were flung in the most unlikely places. Security at the international airports was increased and bomb squads regularly checked each departing aircraft for any explosives. People were afraid to fly because they were afraid of terrorist attacks. The Federal Aviation Administration investigated all of these possibilities and one more. They investigated the possibility that a part on the aircraft had failed and caused the explosion. This wasn't a popular theory because of the Boeing 747's excellent safety record and the fact that aircraft in general weren't in the habit of exploding in mid-air. When all of the information was in and the final report issued, it was determined that the cause of the crash was probably a wire in the fuel indicator system that had grown old and frayed. There wasn't enough direct physical evidence to prove it beyond a shadow of a doubt, however subsequent investigations of aircraft that were as old as the 747 on Flight 800 - twenty five years - showed wiring cracks and fraying in a manner consistent with the theories advanced about the crash of Flight 800 (Adcock 08). The Federal Aviation Agency has since initiated an aging aircraft program with the goal of inspecting the wiring harnesses of older aircraft to see if stepped up inspection and/or replacement were warranted. So far the results show a definite need for the increased maintenance requirements (Adcock 08). When the United States Air Force began to retrofit it's aging fleet of 707 aircraft for use in the Gulf War, it was discovered that the aircraft were in need of complete wiring harness replacement due to cracks and fraying in the current harnesses ("Air Safety Week"). This is not as uncommon a situation as one might think. The safety record of the United States Airlines has remained unparalleled with fewer loss of life accidents per flight than any other airline in the world. The problem that is now being faced is one where there are more aircraft remaining in service much longer than their original design dates. The reasons for this are two fold. The first reason is that the aircraft were originally designed very well and proved to be more resilient than originally thought. The second reason is strictly financial. It is very expensive to purchase new aircraft and it has proven to be a lot less expensive to perform extended maintenance and refit operations on the aging aircraft than to purchase new ones (Adcock 08). The results of these decisions are now being seen in the form of increased accidents and smaller "incidents" with the aircraft in service today. The age of the aircraft in today's airline inventory is not the only factor that has seen a decade of increasing accidents. The maintenance of every aircraft flown by an airline is subject to strict regulations and inspections. "Economic pressures have stimulated many US airlines to contract out more of the maintenance traditionally performed "in-house," and the repair stations are relying ever more on contract labor" ("Air Safety Week"). The problems arise when the airlines initiate cost saving measures such as these and the quality of work is not maintained. There has been a five hundred percent increase in the incidents of unsatisfactory maintenance quality since the airlines began to use the third party repair facilities. There was one incident where the right engine separated from a Boeing 737-200 immediately after takeoff in 1992("Air Safety Week"). The aircraft landed safely and no one was hurt, but this wasn't the case when an engine caught fire on a 737-200 during takeoff. The aircraft overran the runway and stopped in a golf course ("Air Safety Week"). The result was seventy passengers killed out of one hundred and fifteen plus one person killed on the ground. Faulty maintenance procedures were found to be the cause of both accidents. It has been said by FENA that if the DC-10's owned by Bangladesh Airlines had been maintained properly there would be no need to replace them at this time ("Proper Maintenance of DC-10's") . This is one example where refusal to maintain an aircraft properly will severely reduce it's lifespan. The largest concern of the Federal Aviation Administration, and the passengers flying on the airlines, is the apparent lack of quality maintenance when the maintenance is not being done "in house" but is rather being contracted out to a repair facility under FAR Part 145. The mechanics at these repair stations have varying levels of experience and competence and are, for the most part, not paid as well as those working directly for the airlines. Southwest airlines now contracts out over ninety percent of its maintenance and repairs. It has proven to be extremely beneficial financially to do it this way and they feel that safety is not being compromised because they maintain a good relationship with their third-party repair station and they feel that this helps insure a quality job. The repair stations that operate under FAR Part 145 vary a great deal in their size and complexity. There are some that operate with only a few mechanics and others that are quite large. Generally the largest repair facilities have proven to be as safe as in-house systems. It is the smaller one's that appear to have problems. The worst combination appears to be those carriers operating fifteen to twenty aircraft of varying ages in combination with a repair stations operating under FAR Part 145 who employ between one hundred and two hundred people. The largest amount of incidents and unsatisfactory maintenance operations are from this particular combination. Larger repair facilities such as TIMCO seem to have a more than adequate safety and training programs in place. The most serious shortcomings appear to be among those carriers operating 15-20 airplanes who are relying on Part 145 facilities employing between 100-200 people. One of the main problems with insuring the quality of maintenance is the fact that the inspections are carried out by the people working at the repair station. This means that the facilities themselves are providing their own oversight, with less than ten percent of the inspections being done by the airline personnel themselves. As a result, the smaller facilities are faced with the fact that they are in a sense policing themselves and they do not always have the resources, no matter how good their intentions, to manage a good safety and inspection program. The smaller facilities usually have only about fifty percent of their mechanics with Airframe and Powerplant Licenses. The Airframe and Powerplant Licenses are one way to insure a good standard of knowledge among licensed mechanics. The license does not, however, guarantee a good standard of competence and the mechanics at the smaller repair facilities are not typically paid as well as those working for the larger stations or an airline's in house maintenance facility. This sometimes tends to lend itself to a higher incidence of unsatisfactory maintenance jobs and could result in shoddy workmanship, thus increasing the likelihood of an accident. This is particularly true of facilities that are servicing older aircraft where the inspections and maintenance are more critical. The possibility that the repair facility has the ability and knowledge to work on a wide number of aircraft is slim and this brings up the possibility that the facility may not do as good a job on some types of aircraft that it has a limited amount of experience on. Southwest Airlines sends over fifty percent of its maintenance business to a FAR Part 145 repair facility. They defend their actions by pointing out that one of the best ways to insure safety and security in the maintenance programs is to develop and maintain a solid relationship with the repair facility. They state that they are in the business of carrying passengers and that is where their expertise and efforts are dedicated. They leave the maintenance issues to a professional facility where maintenance and repairs are their primary business. They are happy with the results of their decision to outsource their maintenance and their safety record seems to bear this out. They use a large facility that employs a large number of mechanics and this is undoubtably one of the reasons for their success. Other, smaller airlines don't have the resources to use facilities such as these and they are forced to trade off quality for price. This is not always so. Simply paying more does not insure quality work. There are airlines that work very hard to insure a good relationship with their maintenance facility and manage to maintain a good service and safety program and still cut costs. This, however, does not appear to be the norm. The airlines that are compromising on their expenses may just be creating a larger problem than they are trying to avoid. The growing number of aircraft accidents and even smaller incidents are painting a very grim picture of today's airline operations. People are no longer willing to blindly trust the airlines. They listen very carefully when an aircraft is on the news because of a crash or a smaller incident. The customers listen to hear the name of the airline that is operating that aircraft and more often than not the airline will notice a drop in bookings. This translates into lost revenue. The airlines must also consider what happens when a fatality occurs (Dickey 08). The lawsuits or compensation paid for a settlement can be tremendous and could very well spell the end of the airline. This was the case with the crash of ValuJet Flight Number 592 in May of 1996. The result of the investigation into the accident revealed that, while not the cause of the accident, the maintenance program facilitated by the airline was suspect and severe doubts were cast on the safety and security of the aircraft operated by the airline. The result was desertification of many of the aircraft owned by the airline for inspection and safety violations. The airline eventually ended up out of business. The primary cause of the crash was a piece of equipment that was being carried as cargo and was not the result of shoddy maintenance but the crash and the questions about the overall safety of the aircraft drove the company out of business. There have been many instances where the safety of an aircraft has been questioned and, even though the aircraft wasn't found to be at fault, public opinion cost the manufacturer many millions of dollars in revenue due to order cancellations (Dickey 08). One prime example would be the DC-10 that crashed shortly after it was put into service. It was discovered that the aircraft did not have any inherent defects and yet Douglas aircraft, despite a massive public relations campaign, lost millions in cancelled orders. The aircraft ended up seeing more service with foreign airlines than with domestic ones. This is all due to a mistaken impression that the aircraft had a safety issue. Another example of public opinion affecting an airline's revenue is the Alaska Flight 261 crash. The Seattle Times reported incorrectly that there was a problem with a particular inspection cycle for a part on the MD-80 aircraft. This one article affected the business of Alaska Airlines so much that they had the paper print a retraction ("Seattle Times Incorrectly Reports Inspection Cycle"). The undercarriage of a Quantas Jet collapsed during taxi operations prior to takeoff (Cross). The gear let go with a pop and the engine buried itself into the ground and caught fire. The crew and passengers were all evacuated safely and there were no fatalities. It was discovered that the gear had most recently been worked on by a third party service facility due to a cost cutting measure (Cross). The most recent crash is the crash of the Concord. The aircraft had one of the most solid safety records in the industry. It took just one single crash and the aircraft earned a bad reputation (Dickey 08). The investigation hadn't even been completed when people were discussing the possible safety issues with the aircraft. The other Concords in service were taken out of service for inspections and weren't re-certified for flight until they had passed (Dickey 08). The Federal Aviation Administration does not have the resources to provide proper oversight. They are very short in the number of inspectors available and the budget doesn't allow a great deal of flexibility in getting the inspectors out into the field. They have the ability to instantly take an aircraft out of service if they feel that the safety of the airline's passengers is at risk. They can even temporarily decertify an entire type of aircraft if it is felt that there are safety concerns with it ("Hinson"). The problem that they face is that there are far too many aircraft in service today and they are being serviced in too many places for the FAA to provide adequate inspections. They have, however, done everything they can to rectify the situation while operating within their means. They have implemented a change in its policies for handling its revocations ("Hinson"). This has resulted in an increase in the number of revocations and overall has provided a better atmosphere for handling safety issues in a timely manner. The FAA has taken steps to beef up the inspections and toughen the oversight on airlines maintenance programs ("Hinson"). The FAA is not without it's problems even now, however. They delayed telling airlines about aircraft control cables that they had discovered were faulty (Sullivan 08). The same cables were in use by aircraft owned by both civilian airlines and the US Air Force. The Air Force immediately tested the cables and found that they broke at less than half their design stress. The FAA did not test the cables and did not notify the airlines, thus creating a potentially serious situation (Sullivan 08). This just underscores the need for adequate funding and personnel by the FAA. The FAA is obviously doing everything that it can under the circumstances, however the trend toward cost cutting and compromise of maintenance programs is continuing. It is showing no signs of lessening due to the fact that the airlines are continually being squeezed between needing to lower fares and pay higher maintenance costs. Bibliography: WORKS CITED Dickey, Christopher. "What Went Wrong." Newsweek International. August 2000 Fed: Undercarriage collapses on Qantas jet. AAP General News (Australia). April 22, 2000 "FENA for proper maintenance of DC-10s to keep these running, The Independent". September 2000 Hinson, David. "ValuJet Airlines crash." Jet lag.(Federal Aviation Commission ( The New Republic ). 12-16-1996 “Incorrectly Reports Inspection Cycle for Part Implicated in the Alaska Flight 261 Tragedy”. Business Wire. May 2000 "Oversight of Maintenance & Repair Facility Practices Under Examination". Air Safety Week. July 1999 PG Sullivan, John. "FAA delayed telling airlines about failed cables Agency defends move, saying part not crucial for flight control”. The Dallas Morning News. June 2000 Word Count: 2587
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