eve. There are other social benefits which follow on from those discussed above. One of the most important of these is confidence in the Irish economy. With industrial harmony, low interest rates, low inflation and sustained growth comes confidence in the economy. One indicator of the fact that the programmes inspire confidence is this: In 1987, when the PNR was being negotiated, the Federated Union of Employers had to be coerced into the negotiations. Yet in 1993, 95% of senior personnel managers were in favour of a further PESP style agreement. (Gunnigle et al, 1995). The stability of the agreements has provided management with a situation where they can be reasonably sure of what is coming and can plan ahead based on that. The programmes have also allowed successive governments to plan ahead, something normally unheard of. Previously, governments had tended to plan for one fiscal year in the form of the budget, but now we have a situation where they are planning for three years with the programmes. The programmes have also provided a sense of continuity, as successive governments from all political parties have continued the programmes. This form of planning ahead has allowed significant progress in the areas of debt reduction, social welfare and taxation. It is not only in an Irish context that collective bargaining has been seen as desiring an effect on social aspects of the economy. In the UK, where there has been little, if any centralised collective bargaining, Fox states: "[Collective bargaining] has often been seen as, though not by all pluralists, not only as levelling up employee power to an acceptable approximation of that of management, but also as reinforcing government social welfare and redistributive policies in gradually reducing class difference." (Fox, 1985:22) But it would seem that the lack of any centralised bargaining has reduced this impact of collective bargaining; "Collective bargaining has not substantially ...
