sures relatively easier, perhaps to the point that otherwise-legitimate competitive tactics might become anticompetitive. In a way, Microsoft has argued just that when they point to the quality and value of Windows, they're saying it's the best out there, and that's why it has the market share it does (4).However, certain contractual terms required by Microsoft in its dealings with Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) appear decidedly anticompetitive, seemingly intended solely or primarily to extend Microsoft's monopoly in desktop operating systems to the new market for Web browsers. There was competition in Web browsers, and Microsoft's actions preceded a notable decrease in the competition. It's hard to know how to authoritatively explain and surmise Netscape's ultimate loss in momentum -- how much to Microsoft's allegedly-anticompetitive actions and how much to Netscape's failure to execute. But whatever Netscape's faults, it seems that Judge Jackson had evidence from which to find that Microsoft's contractual relations with OEMs crossed the line from "hardball" to "anticompetitive" (4).Three main facts indicate that Microsoft enjoys monopoly power. First Microsoft's share of Intel-compatible PC operating systems is extremely large and stable. Second, Microsoft's dominant market share is protected by a high barrier to entry. Third, and largely as a result of that barrier, Microsoft's customers lack a commercially viable alternative to Windows (1).Judge Jackson might rule that Microsoft harmed Netscape Communications Corp. and other competitors by illegally "tying" its own Internet Explorer browser into the purchase of its Windows operating system. The government argues that Microsoft plotted to kill Netscape by "bolting" Explorer onto Windows. Government lawyer David Boies said this nuts-and-bolts approach to computer software added no value for customers, but gave Explorer an unfair competitive advantage. In a few weeks, if a set...
