Data Bases • Custom Term Papers • Free Term Papers • Free Research Papers • Free Essays • Free Book Reports • Plagiarism? Links • Top 100 Term Paper Sites • Top 25 Essay Sites • Top 50 Essay Sites • Search 97,000 Papers @ DirectEssays.com • Search 101,000 Papers @ ExampleEssays.com • Search 90,000 Papers @ MegaEssays.com Free Essays • Term Paper Sites • Chuck III's Free Essays • Free College Essays • TermPaperSites.com • My Term Papers • Get Free Essays • Essay World • Planet Papers	Search Lots of Essays Back to Subjects - Business Rising Major League Baseball Salaries and the Rising Major League Baseball Salaries and the Rising Major League Baseball Salaries, and the Economic Effect it has on Competition and the Consumer. As long has there has been business, Management and Labor have warred against each other for a bigger piece of the pie. Major League Baseball is no different. In the early years of professional baseball the owners controlled the salaries of the players and decided where they could play and what they would be paid. The players were bound to their team by the Reserve Clause that stated, the services of a player will be reserved exclusively for that team for the next season. This resulted in keeping the player’s salaries artificially low because the players were not allowed to offer their services to any other team. The Reserve Clause was in effect for more than One Hundred years of baseball history. It was challenged several times but the owners had won every time, until in 1970 when the St. Louis Cardinals traded outfielder Curt Flood to the Philadelphia Phillies. Flood refused to play for the Phillies and sued to become a free-agent. Flood’s case was in court for several years going all the way to the Supreme Court. He was never able to play in the Major League again. While he did not win his case, he laid the groundwork for a later case that involved two pitchers, Andy Messersmith and Dave McNally who filed a grievance against the league contending that, because they didn't sign contracts with their previous teams they were free agents. The owners and the Players Association agreed to submit to binding, impartial, arbitration in order to settle this case. On December 23, 1975 the arbitrator Peter Seitz ruled in favor of the players and the Reserve Clause was broken, and the era of free agency began in the Major Leagues. In 1976 when free agency began the average player salary was only $52 thousand dollars, but it has increased steadily ever since. By 1990 the average salary for a Major League Baseball player had risen to $589 thousand dollars. This Year baseball will start the 2001 season with an average player salary of more than $2 million, about 40 times higher than the typical wage in 1976 when free agency began. Average Major League Player Salaries 1976-2000 Year Average Increase/decrease Median1976 $52,300 --- *1977 74,000 41.49% *1978 97,800 32.16% *1979 121,900 24.64% *1980 146,500 20.18% *1981 196,500 34.13% *1982 245,000 24.68% *1983 289,000 17.96% 207,5001984 325,900 12.77% 229,7501985 368,998 13.22% 265,8331986 410,517 11.25% 275,0001987 402,579 -1.93% 235,0001988 430,688 6.98% 235,0001989 489,539 13.66% 280,0001990 589,483 20.42% 350,0001991 845,383 43.41% 412,0001992 1,012,424 19.76% 392,5001993 1,062,780 4.97% 371,5001994 1,154,486 8.63% 450,0001995 1,094,440 -5.20% 275,0001996 1,101,455 0.64% 300,0001997 1,314,420 19.33% 400,0001998 1,377,196 4.78% The constant rise in player’s salaries has created huge disparity in the overall, total payrolls of Major League teams, and it is getting bigger every year. In 1988 the New York Yankees had the highest team payroll at $21.5 million dollars and the Seattle Mariners payroll was the lowest at $6.5 million. The difference between the highest and the lowest was just $15 million dollars, but by the 2000 season the difference had increased to $97.6 million dollars. The Yankees again had the highest payroll at $113.4 million, and the Minnesota Twins payroll was the lowest at $15.8 million. Seventeen other teams had payrolls that were at least 50% less than the Yankees. This disparity has created a situation that has made it very hard for the poorer, small, market teams to compete for players and championships. In 1999 the eight teams that made the playoffs, the New York Yankees, Texas Rangers, Atlanta Braves, Cleveland Indians, Boston Red Sox, New York Mets, Arizona Diamondbacks, and Houston Astros, all ranked in the top ten in total payroll. Since the strike, in 1994, every playoff team except for the Houston Astros, in 1997, has been in the top half of the league in total payroll. The year 2000 was an exception to that rule. In 2000 the Chicago White Sox were able to win the American League Central Division with a payroll of just $36.98 million, and the Oakland Athletics won the A.L. West with a payroll of $32.17 million. The Highest and Lowest Payrolls 1988-2000 1988 N.Y. Yankees $21.5 Seattle Mariners $6.5 1989 N.Y. Mets $20.2 Philadelphia Phillies $7.8 1990 K.C. Royals $23.8 Baltimore Orioles $6.9 1991 Oakland Athletics $40.1 Houston Astros $10.1 1992 Toronto Blue Jays $49.8 Cleveland Indians $8.2 1993 Toronto Blue Jays $52.2 San Diego Padres $11.2 1994 N.Y. Yankees $48.3 San Diego Padres $12.1 1995 N.Y. Yankees $57.6 N.Y. Mets $11.4 1996 N.Y. Yankees $60.3 Milwaukee Brewers $9.8 1997 N.Y. Yankees $69.4 Oakland Athletics $7.1 1998 Baltimore Orioles $73.8 Montreal Expos $8.3 1999 N.Y. Yankees $91.9 Florida Marlins $13.6 2000 N.Y. Yankees $113.4 Minnesota Twins $15.8 The above chart shows the Highest and Lowest team payrolls since 1988. The difference between the highest and lowest number in the lowest payroll column is only $9.3 million, but in the highest payroll column it is $92.4 million. This shows the tremendous difference there is between the rich clubs and the poor ones. In 1998 the Montreal Expos’ payroll was $8.3 million and they had an income of $40 million dollars, but in contrast to the Expos, the Yankees and the Orioles had revenues of about $150 million each and payrolls of nearly $74 million. Five players; Gary Sheffield ($14,936,667), Albert Belle ($10,000,000), Greg Maddux ($9,600,000), Mark McGwire ($8,928,354) and Barry Bonds ($8,916,667) each earned more than the entire Expos payroll. This is a dramatic example of the competitive imbalance that exists and is rapidly growing within Major League Baseball. During the early 1990’s, the baseball owners became very concerned with the financial situation of baseball and the economic disaster that they claimed was looming if something was not done to control the rising player salaries, and address the competitive and financial imbalance that was becoming a concern for the owners and threatened to ruin the smaller market clubs. The owners believed that baseball’s financial situation was out of control. So, in 1994 the owners decided to go to war with the Major League Player’s Association in order to pursue a hard salary cap that would help to hold down the rising tide of player’s salaries. The two opposing groups became locked up in a collective bargaining stalemate that resulted in the players going on strike on August 12, 1994 after being threatened by the owners with a lockout. The strike wiped out two months of the ‘94 season and caused the cancellation of the World Series for the first time in 90 years. Before the strike Major League Baseball was enjoying its best season ever in game attendance and baseball’s television ratings were at their highest levels in ten years. There were players challenging some of baseball’s biggest records and the Pennant races were very competitive even in small market towns like Montreal and Seattle. In the 1950’s, before free agency, there were 16 teams in Major League Baseball, but by the mid 1990’s the Major Leagues had grown to include 30 teams. Having so many teams has made it increasingly difficult for the owners to agree on a homogenous agenda. The inability of the owners to agree on an agenda resulted in the sports labor movement being able to shift the balance of power decidedly in the favor of the players. The owners had gone to war to get the players to agree to a hard salary cap, but by the time the owners had come to an agreement about what should be done to address the financial problems facing baseball, the players had already reached a level of combined wealth that allowed them to hold out indefinitely against the new economic system the owners wanted to put into place in 1994. Because of the bargaining power of the players the owners were unable to get the salary cap they wanted, instead they were forced to accept a watered-down luxury tax that penalized the teams with the highest payrolls and modestly subsidized baseball’s poorest teams. The tax has had some deterrent effect on the spending of some teams. There have been some clubs that have chosen not to sign some high-priced players to avoid paying into the revenue-sharing pool set up by the luxury tax. But, the plan has done nothing to close the gap between the richest and poorest clubs in the Major Leagues. The New York Yankees generate $60 million dollars in local television broadcast revenue, and they have not blinked at paying $5 million extra to field the best team in baseball. Also, teams like the Braves and Orioles, with their new high-revenue ballparks, have not hesitated to run up the tab to stay in contention year after year. If the economics of baseball were out of control in 1994, then today they are really a run away train. Back in 1994 the top payrolls were about $30 million. The Atlanta Braves paid the nucleus of their great pitching staff, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine, and John Smoltz, a total of $11 million, and the owners were bemoaning the six-year, $43 million contract the San Francisco Giants signed with Barry Bonds that made him the highest-paid player in the game. That seems small in comparison to many of the deals that have been signed since the end of the strike, under the new collective bargaining agreement. In 1998 there was little uproar when The New York Mets signed Mike Piazza to a seven-year, $91 million contract, and that same year the Yankees gave Bernie Williams $87.5 million for seven years and the Anaheim Angels signed Mo Vaughn for seven years and $80 million. Then in 1999, the Los Angeles Dodgers signed pitcher Kevin Brown to a seven-year $115 million contract that sent alarms throughout the baseball world. The very next year the Dodgers signed outfielder Shawn Green to an $84 million dollar contract. That means the Dodgers will pay two players an average of $29 million a year for the next six years. That is more the 1999 payrolls of seven teams. Today Maddux, Glavine, and Smoltz combine to account for over $40 million in salary per year, which was more than the entire payroll of eleven teams in 1999. In 2000 the highest payroll is well over $100 million, and several others are approaching the $100 million dollar level, and they are getting bigger every year. 2000 Major League Baseball Team Payrolls 15. Tampa Bay Devil Rays $55,157,593 18. San Francisco Giants $54,235,841 22. Philadelphia Phillies $36,683,832 Totals are based on rosters as of August 31,2000. Year after year baseball owners keep saying that the game is nearing economic collapse, teams are losing money, the industry is $2 billion dollars in debt, drowning in its own red ink, and there is a skyrocketing financial and competitive imbalance between big and small market clubs. The Commissioner Bud Selig says that the game needs major changes in the way its financial affairs are handled, and that baseball cannot continue down the path it is presently on. But, while they say one thing they seem to be doing another, teams still are continuing to sign players to bigger and bigger contracts at an ever-increasing rate. In October of 2000 Carlos Delgado was signed to a new record setting deal that pays, the Toronto 1st Baseman, an average of $17 million per year over six years. That deal raised the annual salary record from $15 million to $17 million. Which is an increase of 12 percent over the previous high salary set by Kevin Brown of the Los Angeles Dodgers in 1999. Just Eight weeks later, during a three-day period at the end of December 2000, came $533 million worth of player contracts for just three players. Pitcher Mike Hampton signed a record seven-year $123.8 million contract with the New York Mets. Hampton’s record lasted less than two full days as the biggest deal in baseball history, before the Boston Red Sox signed outfielder Manny Ramirez to a nine-year $162 million contract that raised a players salary to $18 million dollars per year for the first time ever. But, those deals paled in comparison to the deal that was signed the very next day by shortstop Alex Rodriguez. The Texas Rangers signed the twenty-five year old to a ten-year, $252 million dollar contract that totally shattered the previously held conception of any kind of restraint on players’ salaries. Consider that in 1990, just ten years ago, the highest paid player was Will Clark the 1St Baseman for the San Francisco Giants, and he was paid the comparatively small amount of $3.75 million dollars per year. Rodriguez now makes almost seven times what Will Clark made in 1990. Rodriguez’s deal, which pays him an average of $25.2 million dollars per year, beats the previous annual record of $18 million by an incredible 28 percent. Historically, each new record deal has rarely topped the previous one by more than 20 percent, but this deal pays Rodriguez nearly time and a half of what the next highest paid player, Manny Ramirez, makes. The total value of the contract is $2 million more than the Texas Rangers owner, Tom Hicks, and his partners paid for the franchise just three years ago. Rodriguez is not the only player with a contract that is worth more than some franchises. Mike Hampton’s $123.8 million contract with the Colorado Rockies is worth more than three entire franchises. Manny Ramirez’s new $162 million contract with the Boston Red Sox is worth more than six franchises, and Alex Rodriguez’s $252 million contract is worth more than the value of eighteen franchises, more than twice the value of four franchises, and is almost three times the value of the League’s poorest franchise the Montreal Expos. 2000 Major League Baseball Franchise Values (in millions). With players now worth more than many franchises, and player salaries that are still rising every year it has created a situation that makes generating revenue a higher priority than ever before, and the gap between the rich teams and the poor ones keeps getting bigger. Herk Robinson, general manager of the Kansas City Royals said this about the latest round of player signings “The hole between us and the big revenue clubs just got a little deeper didn’t it?” The Royals ended the 2000 season with a $24.5 million payroll, which is $700,000 less than Alex Rodriguez’s average annual salary. Robinson goes on to say, “I can’t see anything beneficial about these signings at all, and the industry as a whole can’t support them. There is no doubt that it will deflate the fans here a bit, and make it harder for us to keep our guys.” The financial and competitive imbalance that exists between the small-market teams and the large-market teams has been created and fed by a disparity in revenue. It is not so much a question of the size of the market, but rather the amount of revenue that the team can generate within its local market. Some of the biggest cities in America like Minneapolis Minnesota, Oakland California and Miami Florida are considered small markets while cities that are of comparable size are considered large markets like St. Louis, San Francisco, and Houston. The real difference between these cities is the amount of revenue the teams can generate. Teams generate revenue through ticket sales, merchandise, local television revenues, advertising, and official sponsorships as well as various other revenue producing activities. The major difference between the low revenue clubs and the high revenue clubs is revenue generated by ticket sales and local television revenues. Television revenues vary widely according to the individual markets, but the teams that seem to do the best with local television revenues are the teams that are perennially competitive. The New York Yankees, winners of four of the last five World Series Championships, receive local television revenues of close to $60 million per year. On the other hand some of the small market teams receive less than $10 million per year from local television. Another major factor that separates the high revenue franchises from the low revenue clubs is ticket revenue and it is not just because the large market teams charge higher prices for their tickets. The large market teams do charge more for their tickets, but they also sell more tickets because they put a better product on the field. It is all a vicious cycle that helps the rich clubs get richer and keeps the poor teams perpetually poor. However, there is a way out of the revenue cellar that is helping more small market teams gain a solid foothold towards becoming competitive. These teams are building new fan friendly, old-style stadiums that give the fans more than just a ballgame but instead an entire entertainment experience for the whole family. These stadiums have museums, restaurants, swimming pools, video game arcades, and specialty shops. The movement towards new retro-style ballparks started in Baltimore in 1992 when the Oriole opened Oriole Park at Camden Yards. It was an instant success that has sold out more than eighty percent of the games that have been played there, and the ballpark has revitalized that entire downtown area of Baltimore. Similar results have been seen in cities like Cleveland Ohio, Houston Texas, Arlington Texas, Detroit Michigan, Seattle Washington and San Francisco California which have all opened new ballparks in the last few years. Between 1995 and 1999 the San Francisco Giants have had aggregate operating losses of $97 million. Last year they moved into Pac Bell Park and the value of the franchise rose 12 percent to $237 million, and their stadium revenues increased by 250 percent over the previous year. All of these new stadiums have helped these teams to become more competitive by raising their revenues and creating excitement for the fans and the city the team plays in. Other cities like Milwaukee Wisconsin and Cincinnati Ohio are opening new ballparks this season and hope to enjoy the same renaissance that other cities have enjoyed. However, all is not just roses for the teams with the highest revenues and the newest ballparks. Baseball has mortgaged its future with $3.7 billion worth of guaranteed players salaries over the next six years. Last season 18 Major League teams lost money, and two-thirds are expected to lose money this year. One of the major ways teams have decided to try to stem the tide of player’s salaries and operating costs is to raise the price of tickets. Every Major League team has raised ticket prices at least once in the past three years, and eighteen teams have raised them more than once during that time. The price for the players continues to get higher and that subsequently affects the price of the tickets that are purchased by the consumers, but the consumers are becoming increasingly resentful of the paychecks received by the players, because they are subsequently forced to pay more and more to go to a game. Team-by-team low and high ticket prices for 1999, and average ticket prices for 1997, 1998, and 1999. Low-high ’99 avg ’98 avg. ’97 avg. WESTAnaheim $2-$44 $13.35 $12.26 $10.26 Oakland $5-$26 $11.00 $10.50 $10.50 Seattle $5-$28 $15.71 $14.07 $13.40 Texas $2-$30 $19.40 $16.07 $13.28 CENTRALChicago $10-$22 $16.66 $16.66 $16.12 Cleveland $6-$30 $19.05 $17.35 $13.27 Detroit $5-$25 $12.23 $10.40 $10.40 Kansas City $7-$17 $12.50 $11.12 $9.65 Minnesota $4-$19 $11.00 $11.00 $10.33 EASTBaltimore $7-$35 $19.77 $18.02 $15.66 Boston $12-$35 $23.84 $19.98 $17.72 New York $8-$29 $21.00 $15.15 $16.27 Tampa Bay $1.50-$22 $16.02 $14.25 N/A Toronto $6-$40 $18.78 $16.00 $14.86 NATIONAL LEAGUE Low-high ’99 avg. ’98 avg. ’97 avg. WESTArizona $1-$50 $16.48 $14.70 N/AColorado $1-$30 $14.55 $14.55 $11.38 Los Angeles $6-$14 $13.67 $12.00 $11.16 San Diego $5-$18 $11.24 $11.35 $10.59 San Francisco $2.50-$24 $20.86 $18.50 $10.13 CENTRALChicago $6-$21 $15.33 $14.63 $14.63 Cincinnati $3-$9 $9.70 $8.37 $8.37 Houston $1-$26 $11.88 $10.70 $10.45 Milwaukee $5-$25 $14.00 $14.00 $9.57 Pittsburgh $1-$17 $11.00 $9.67 $8.20 St. Louis $2-$24 $17.39 $15.47 $12.36 EASTAtlanta $1-$33 $19.08 $17.48 $17.48Florida $2-$28 $11.42 $11.42 $10.11 Montreal $7-$33 $9.81 $9.81 $6.81 New York $1-$30 $19.66 $16.23 $13.06 Philadelphia $6-$20 $14.20 $11.02 $11.02 With consumer confidence wavering and the possibility of baseball’s ninth work stoppage, since 1972, looming when the current collective bargaining agreement, between the players and the owners, ends on October 31, 2001, how can Baseball keep from tearing itself apart and disintegrating into the kind of labor strife that occurred in 1994? Many owners point out the all-time attendance record baseball set in 2000, of 72.7 million, and the new six-year, $2.5 billion Television contract just signed with Fox Sports as evidence of the present strength and prosperity that Major League Baseball is enjoying. But, despite the record set for total attendance, half of all Major League teams actually saw a decline in attendance last year, and there are significant ticket-price increases scheduled for more than a dozen teams, this year, that threaten to further diminish attendance. Furthermore, the television ratings for last year’s All-Star Game and World Series were the lowest ever. All of these things combine to paint a grim picture for the future of Major League Baseball in the 21st Century, but there are some possible solutions that have been suggested by the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics. The Panel was charged, in 1999, to spend eighteen months studying the financial problems facing baseball and to find ways to strengthen the financially weaker teams. They were led by Yale University President Richard Levin, political columnist George F. Will, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker and former Senate majority leader George Mitchell, and consulted by 14 team owners and the players union. They developed five proposals to help baseball face its financial challenges. The first was for the league to raise the percentage of local revenue that is shared between the teams from 20 percent to 40 percent with the bulk of the money going to help the teams that are struggling financially. Second, they suggested the creation of a 50 percent competitive balance tax on payrolls that exceed $84 million. It would tax the teams on the money they spend beyond $84 million, and that figure would remain fixed even as salaries continue to climb. Third, the panel proposed the development of a competitive draft in which the eight worst teams each year could select players not on any other team’s 40-man roster. The draft would include international players and eliminate free-agent compensation picks. These are draft picks that teams get when another team signs a free agent away from their team. Fourth, they suggested the establishment of an expanded central fund to distribute pooled money from sources such as broadcast TV, the Internet, and product licensing and allow the commissioner to allocate funds unevenly, if necessary. Finally the panel advocated keeping strategic franchise relocation open as an option for teams operating without any hope of competing in their current market. All of these suggestions would most likely help to diminish the competitive imbalance that exists in Major League Baseball today between the large market and small market franchises, but it is also fairly unlikely that any of their proposals will be adopted any time in the near future. Baseball owners are historically very stubborn and resistant to change, but with the current situation baseball finds itself in, it may require unprecedented cooperation among the owners, and also between the owners and the players union, in order to solve the serious problems that face baseball in the near future. It is important that they remember that Baseball had a very difficult time recovering from the last labor related work stoppage it faced six years ago, and it will be even harder, if not impossible, to recover if it happens again. Baseball owners cannot afford to be so selfish with their own money that they force the poorer teams into financial ruin, and they also cannot afford to alienate the fans that they depend on as the basis for all the money they all make. Bibliography: References 1. Eric Fisher; Dick Heller. Financial House of Cards: Insight on the News. Jan 29, 2001. Washington D.C. 2. Hal Bodley. Team Salary Disparities Grow: USA Today. Nov 11, 1998. Arlington, VA. 3. Eric Fisher. Baseball’s New Pitch: Insight on the News. Aug 21, 2000. Washington D.C. 4. Michael K. Ozanian; Kurt Badenhausen. Baseball Going Broke? Don’t Believe It: Wall Street Journal. Jul 27, 2000. New York, NY. 5. Ken Rosenthal. Low Revenue Contenders Need Help to Stay at Top: The Sporting News. Oct 16, 2000. St. Louis MO. 6. Bob Cohn. Baseball’s Great Divide: Insight on the News. Apr 17, 2000. Washington D.C. 7. Hal Bodley. Selig Will Need Magic to Restore Parity, Payroll Disparity Hit $97.6 Million: USA Today. Dec 8, 2000. Arlington, VA. 8. Peter Schmuck. When Good Professional Sports Leagues Go Bad: The Sporting News. Dec 7, 1998. St. Louis MO. 9. Hal Bodley. Selig Asked to Testify on Payroll Disparities: USA Today. Nov 17, 2000. Arlington, VA. 10. Dave Kindred. Money Grubbers and Tight Fists: The Sporting News. Aug 21, 2000. St. Louis MO. 11. Hal Bodley. Baseball Gets Salary Warning: USA Today. Nov 11, 1998. Arlington, VA. 12. Anthony Schoettle. MLB Playing Hard Ball With Ticket Prices: About Sports Business Guide. Jan 26, 2001. Chicago, IL. 13. Chuck Johnson. Baseball’s Average Ticket Up 7% to $15.26: USA Today. Feb 11, 1999. Arlington, VA. 14. Mel Antonen. Baseball Fans Pick Up Tab, Escalating Price of Talent Results in Another Ticket Increase: USA Today. Jan 22, 1998. Arlington, VA. 15. Hal Bodley. Guaranteed Salaries Increase to $3.7 Billion After Spending Spree: USA Today. Dec 13, 2000. Arlington, VA. 16. Chuck Johnson. Baseball’s Big-Ticket Situation 22 Teams Make a Hike for Payrolls: USA Today. Feb 11, 1999. Arlington, VA. 17. David Leonherdt. Pay Ball! Baseball’s New Season: New York Times. Nov 12, 2000. New York, NY. 18. Bud Selig Means Business: CNNSI.com. Nov 21, 2000. Atlanta, GA. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/2000/11/21/baseball_congress_ap/ 19. 2000 Major League Baseball Salaries: USA Today. May 1, 2000. Arlington, VA. 20. 1999-2000 Major League Baseball Team and Player Salaries: About.com. Aug 31, 2000. Chicago, IL. http://sportsbusiness.about.com/sports/sportsbusiness/library/salary/mlb/9900/bl_teams_9900.htm 21. Final 2000 Payroll Figures: CNNSI.com. Nov 21, 2000. Atlanta, GA. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/2000/11/21/2000_payrolls/ 22. History of Highest Paid Players: ESPN.com. Jan 15, 1999. Bristol, CT. http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/mlbsalary.html 23. Highest Salaries: CNNSI.com. Dec 11, 2000. Atlanta, GA. http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/mlb/news/2001/10/20/highest_salaries_ap/ 24. Franchise Values: The Hartford Courant. May 29, 2000. Hartford, CT. 25. 2000 MLB Team Payrolls: About.com. Aug 31, 2000. Chicago, IL.http://baseball.about.com/sports/baseball/library/weekly/blteamsalaries.htm 26. MLB Player Extend Collective Bargaining Agreement: About.com. Aug 29, 2000. Chicago IL. http://sportsbusiness.about.com/sports/sportsbusiness/library/n…/bl082900news.htm Word Count: 4279
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