erpretively alter a film's presentation and representation of embodied and enworlded experience, but could not control or contain its autonomous and ephemeral flow and rhythm, or materially possess its animated experience. Now, of course, with the advent of videotape and VCRs, the spectator can alter the film's temporality and easily possess, at least, its inanimate "body." However, the ability to control the autonomy and flow of the cinematic experience through "fast forwarding," "replaying," and "freezing" [24] and the ability to possess the film's body and animate it at will at home are functions of the materiality and technological ontology of the electronic--a materiality that increasingly dominates, appropriates, and transforms the cinematic. In its pre-electronic state and original materiality, however, the cinematic mechanically projects and makes visible for the very first time not just the objective world, but the very structure and process of subjective, embodied vision--hitherto only directly available to human beings as that invisible and private structure we each experience as "my own." That is, the materiality of the cinematic gives us concrete and empirical insight and makes objectively visible the reversible, dialectical, and social nature of our own subjective vision. Speaking of human vision, Merleau-Ponty tells us: "As soon as we see other seers...henceforth, through other eyes we are for ourselves fully visible...For the first time, the seeing that I am is for me really visible; for the first time I appear to myself completely turned inside out under my own eyes."[25] The cinematic uniquely allows this philosophical turning, this objective insight into the subjective structure of vision, into oneself as both viewing subject and visible object, and, remarkably, into others as the same. Again, the paradoxical status of the "more human than human" replicants in Blade Runner is instructive. Speaking to the biotechnologi...
