nts. Able to give precedence to employees rather than shareholders, they can concentrate on expanding market share rather than short-term profit.ConclusionsGenerally, the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and U.S. courts have been insulated from statutory requirements and political pressures to pursue industrial policy considerations in the formation of antitrust policy. Antitrust law has focused on maximizing consumer welfare and economic efficiency. Competition has been the industrial policy of the United States, at least as compared to conditions in Japan.U.S. enforcement focuses on ensuring that markets remain competitive. For example, U.S. law is tough on the abusive business practices of large (dominant) firms that may thwart competition, and on cartels. However, U.S. law is not inclined to regulate large firms seeking to defend or gain market share through fair means (e.g., innovation and superior business acumen), or to regulate agreements between large firms and their suppliers or distributors as long as these do not block market participation by other firms. U.S. merger policy is preemptive, seeking to ensure that competition is sustained.Federal enforcement agencies vigorously seek out antitrust violations, using regional offices around the country. The suits brought in federal courts by private firms, individuals, and the several states play an important role in enforcement too. Criminal penalties are meted out for egregious violations like price fixing.Since the Meiji Restoration (1868), Japan has used industrial policies to catch up and, more recently, to compete with the United States For example, as early as the 1880s, zaibatsu were used to neutralize what the Japanese viewed as the destabilizing consequences of excessive competition. Through industry associations, Japanese governments have used zaibatsu to address the employment consequences of recession and the problems in maturing industries, to ...
