rs tend to be rather stagnant, a harvester could buy a spot of the Bay to dredge. The government would have to find a way to enforce this method through fines or coast guards; the cost of enforcement would probably be fairly low as compared to the benefits for fisheries. This would be a radical change in the industry because fisheries are considered a near perfect example of a common property resource. Through this method over-harvesting would be diminished as well as pollution greatly lessened. The problem with this method is the polluters would cause a technical externality upon the oyster bed owners. Their pollution would directly effect the economic value of the bed. Hence the government would have to mandate waste controls for on-land industry to protect the fisheries. The owners, through bed pricing and innovative pollution technology control in the water, would deal with the pollution that is still left over. Capital, in this instance, would be substituted for labor; so many sea-men would lose their jobs, but most are losing their opportunity cost through fishery labor anyway. So the loss of their preferred job is offset by their ability to make better wages elsewhere (Santopietro and Shabman, 413). The Privatization of Oyster fisheries seems to be the least cost solution to the government in attempting to find the optimal satisfaction between land industry and Bay fisheries. Privatization does not work for all Bay industry. Fisheries that specialize in fish and crabs cannot be privatized because of the migration of their products. The fishing industry in the Chesapeake Bay has declined in sales by and average of 10% during 1996 and 1997 (University System of Maryland). The loss in seafood sales is due to a fish disease called Pfiesteria. The Pfiesteria problem became very publicized in 1997. People in the Bay area became aware of the dangers of eating infected seafood and began buying less fish. Lipton did a ma...
