ution policies, the existent wide gap between the poor and the rich stretched even more. And last, the 44% worst group in Latin American --Guatemala, Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina-- also present gini ratios ranging between a minimum of 46.6 in Ecuador and a high of 63.4 in Brazil. Similar negative effects to those incurred by the 18% group, the 44% worst group showed high levels of inequality, and given the considerable increases in unemployment, most likely worst cases of poverty than the other Latin American groups. As a conclusion, we find that in the two extremes 1. ) Where economic growth took place, for instance Costa Ricas economic growth of 3.0% annually during the 80s and 5.6% in the early 90s, and 2.) Where economic growth was absent, as was the case for Brazils critical economic decreases during the 80s and the early 90s, from 2.7% annually to 2.2% the levels of income inequality were considerably high. Therefore, for Latin American countries economic growth did not signal decreases in income inequality.As the evidence shows, up to 1996, Latin American leaders implemented policies that lead to economic growth, but hesitated to adopt reforms that would improve the equality of income between the rich and the poor. Therefore, any positive or negative internal or external factor influencing pressure on a countrys economic growth meant one of two things for the Latin American poor. A boost in economic growth signaling that the poor had become slightly less poor with respects to themselves but not the rich, assuming labor transfers from agriculture to industrial. Or, on the other hand, a declining growth emphasized higher unemployment, assuming layoffs in either agriculture or industry, or in both, and consequently, reaching worst poverty levels than before. During the 1970s, one principal external factor --international loans or investments-- played a significant role in the economic ...
