iminalized peace economy. Indeed, whatever political group might take control of Afghanistan, the economic incentives for misgovernment are nearly irresistible. Only the drug and transit trade are really worth the effort of taxation, while the rest of the economy is hardly productive enough to make governing it worthwhile. It is difficult to recover the cost of more than a very sparse administration of such an economy and society. Such a political economy would leave the power holders as unaccountable to most Afghan people as they were under previous regimes. Most of the population would be left to fend for themselves, in conditions of greater security, but without a development agenda, public services, or reforms, notably in the status of women.Such a peace would continue to threaten the region, as expanding drug trade, money laundering, and smuggling would undermine governance in several countries, strengthen Taliban-like forces in Pakistan, continue to pose both political and practical obstacles to international reconstruction assistance, and provoke a defensive reaction from Afghanistan’s other neighbors in Iran and Central Asia. The resulting tensions among and within states in the region would make such a peace elusive indeed.A more challenging but, if successful, more rewarding alternative, is to consider peacemaking in Afghanistan as part of a larger problem, of transforming the political economy of a region.The current dysfunctional regional political and economic relationships would also have to be changed. At the moment Pakistan’s actions in Afghanistan are the result of semi autonomous groups within the state and society pursuing their goals.Pakistan needs to develop the institutional basis for articulating a national interest that would unite both economic and security concerns, as well as the welfare of its own people. Articulation of such a national interest would also favor more equitable relations with Afgha...
