se that the standards and disciplines of the WTO constitute the foundation on which the FTAA is to be constructed, but to be a success it must exceed these. In addition, the FTAA process co-exists with existing trade agreements and the sub-regional trade blocs can have a place at the negotiating table. As is also clear from the list of principles, the FTAA will not exist as a final agreement until each issue has been negotiated (single undertaking) with the approval of all thirty-four nations. The objectives and principles also mandate special consideration be given to the smaller, less developed countries of the hemisphere. These provisions reflect both the unique challenges facing the smaller, poorer countries and their influence in a process in which each country, regardless of size, in effect has veto power.With the FTAA negotiations still at an early stage, it would be useful to remember that the important decisions in multilateral trade talks usually do not get made until the very end, frequently when it appears as though the talks will fail to produce a significant agreement. This pattern is built into the FTAA process as the negotiations are conducted as a single undertaking, and there is no agreement until everything is decided. The biggest slow down of the negotiations was the continued failure of the U.S. Congress to renew the President Clintons fast-track authority, his ability to negotiate trade agreements and submit them to up-or-down votes. The 1994 Miami Summit ended with assurances from President Clinton that he would secure fast-track authority and use it to gain Chiles admission to NAFTA. Without it, not only has Chiles admission to NAFTA fallen by the wayside, but there are growing questions about U.S. approval of the final FTAA agreement. Doubts concerning Washingtons resolve and leadership have clouded the negotiations and provided an opening for countries not enthusiastic in their commitment to hemispheric integra...
