ological manner than Mao had done, their moral force. This is not to say that the idea of economic reform was embraced enthusiastically by all members of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in 1978. To a great extent, the issue of economic reform became politicized as the issue was used as a means by Deng Xiaoping to attain the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Mao's successor, Hua Guofeng, had "tried to prove himself a worthy successor to Mao by draping himself in the mantle of Maoist tradition. His approach to economic development was orthodox Maoism with an up-to-date, international twist" (Shirk 35). This approach was tied heavily to the development of China's oil reserves. "When, in 1978, estimates of the oil reserves were revised downward, commitments to import plants and expand heavy industry could not be sustained" (Shirk 35). Deng took advantage of this economic crisis to discredit Hua and aim for leadership of the party. "Reform policies became Deng's platform against Hua for post-Mao leadership" (Shirk 36). Given this history of economic reform, it is evident that "under the present system economic questions are necessarily political questions" (Dorn, James A. "Pricing and Property: The Chinese Puzzle." pg. 43). Once Deng and his faction had prevailed, it was necessary for some sort of economic reform to evolve. The initial form the new economy took was not a radical one. China was "still a state in which the central government retained the dominant power in economic resource allocation and responsible local officials worked for the interest of the units under their control" (Solinger, Dorothy J. China's Transition from Socialism: Statist Legacies and Market Reforms pg. 103). However, as time passed, some basic aspects of the old system were altered either by design or via the process of what might be called benign neglect. As Shirk points out, in rural areas, decollectivization was occurring: "decision mak...