hinese seemed to fear that Deng's policies were drawing China back toward its former semi-colonial status as a "market where the imperialist countries dump their goods, a raw material base, a repair and assembly workshop, and an investment center." (Nathan 51). It is interesting to note the symptoms of a national character that would subscribe to the above sentiment. In an article written in 1981, just two years after the Open Policy was first proposed, Andrew J. Nathan noted the almost pathological resistance to foreign intervention in the Chinese economy: "Some Chinese fear that reliance on imported technology will encourage a dependent psychology ... Many Chinese perceive joint ventures as a costly form of acquisition. 'Some people worry: Won't we be suffering losses by letting foreigners make profits in our country?'" (52). The Chinese were as vociferous about issues of sovereignty. Nathan maintained that the Mao-led revolution, which culminated in victory in 1949, had been fueled by "an intense patriotism: ... once China had 'stood up,' no infringement on its sovereignty, no matter how small, should be permitted" (53). These feelings were manifested in denying foreign businessmen long-term, multiple entry visas, resisting "increased foreign economic contacts" and alteration of current ways of doing things, and disinclination to become involved in government-to-government loans and joint ventures lest Chinese become exploited in some way (Nathan 53-55). Given these hesitancies on the part of the Chinese society vis-a-vis foreign relations, it is impressive that Deng and his allies were able initially to create and implement the Open Policy since many members of the society at large were resistant to becoming involved in a policy so antithetical to the Chinese national character. However, once the successes of the Open Policy were apparent, resistance to the plan by the populace waned. Moreover, given the confluence of politics and e...
