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Ford Pinto Trial

Ford Pinto Trial The objective of this paper is to investigate what led to the Ford pinto criminal trial and the impact that it had. What led up to the criminal indictment of Ford, the trial itself, the verdict of the trial will be discussed. The Impact that this trial has had on the Automobile industry will also be investigated. In the late 1960's there was strong competition from VW and several Japanese companies in the small car market. Due to this competition Ford hurried the design of their small car, the Pinto, to market. Since the car was rushed into market and the specifications for the car were that it weigh under 2000 pounds and cost less than $2000, safety was not a major concern in the design of the pinto.1 In pre-production testing Ford found that the gas tank was likely to leak and possibly burst into flames when it is struck from behind. Internal documents show that eleven of the tests averaging thirty one miles per hour were performed before the Pinto went into production. In only three of the eleven tests did the fuel tank in the Pinto not rupture. In one test a plastic wiffle ball was placed between the front of the gas tank between the tank and the differential housing so that four bolts would not tear into the tank. In the next successful test a piece of steel was placed between the fuel tank and the bumper. In the third test the fuel tank was lined with a rubber liner. Although Ford found that fuel tank rupture was likely to happen they decided to go ahead with this design because assembly line machinery was all ready tooled and they concluded that it was not cost efficient to add an $5.08 rubber bladder to the car cost to the car to remedy the design flaw, instead they determined that it would be cheaper to settle or fight any civil law suits rather then remedy this problem.3 In their cost analysis, that would have improved fuel tank safety for their whole line of cars and trucks, they concluded that there would be 180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn injuries, and 2100 burned vehicles at a cost of $200,000 per burn death, $67,000 per serious burn injury, and $700 per burned vehicle which came up to a total cost of $49.5 million. The estimated cost to prevent leakage in their cars and trucks was $11 dollars each. So with sales of 11 million cars and 1.5 million light trucks the total cost to improve fuel tank safety would be $137 million.3 It was not until 1977 that Ford felt it needed to change the design of the Pinto in order to remedy these fuel tank problems.2 Following numerous lawsuits filed by burn victims accusing Ford of defectively designing the Ford Pinto's fuel tank the issue finally got national attention. In the 1977 September/October issue of Mother Jones there was an article written by Mark Dowie named "Pinto Madness". This article told of Ford's decision to sell a car in which they knew hundreds of people would be burnt to death. To make sure that this information did not just stay in the pages of Mother Jones, Dowie called a press conference on August 10, 1977 in Washington D.C. in order to get national exposure.3 That day as a result of this announcement the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) announced a preliminary evaluation of the Pinto's Dangers. One month later NHTSA announced that they had initiated a formal defect investigation to determine whether the problem constitutes a safety related defect within the meaning of the National Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.2 Mid-February of the next year the Pinto's problems were in the media's headlines again. In a landmark case a jury awarded Richard Grimshaw, a Pinto burn victim, $125 million in punitive damages and another $2.8 million in compensatory damages, "The largest award ever made by a jury in a personal injury case".2 About the same time $666,280 was awarded to the family of Lily Grey, who had died in an accident. These amounts were much more than the $200,000 for a human life and the $67,000 for personal injury that Ford had originally projected in their cost analysis. As a direct result of these judgments Time ran a story titled "Ford's $128.5 Million Headache".2 In May of 1978 NHSTA notified ford that there had been an initial determination of a safety related defect in the pinto. After that Ford, pressured by the civil lawsuits and the media attention, issued a recall of all 1971-1976 Pintos and all 1975-1976 Bobcats, denying any wrongdoing.2 Ford tried to get the recall out as fast as they could, but they did not do it fast enough. On August 10, 1978 while driving on U.S. highway 33 in northern Indiana in their 1973 Ford Pinto tragedy occurred. Judy, Lyn, and Donna Ulrich were hit in the rear by a van and the Pinto burst into flames. Two of the girls were trapped inside the inferno and killed quickly. Judy, the driver, was thrown out of the car but received third degree burns over 95 percent of her body, she died eight hours later.1 After the Ulrich's horrible accident, Mike Cosentino, Elkhart County Indiana's States Attorney, decided to file criminal charges of reckless homicide against Ford powered by the information that ford had endangered the victims not inadvertently but intentionally. At the indictment, both Ford officials and Cosentino gave their arguments for and against the indictment. The grand jury agreed with Consentino that Ford had acted with moral irresponsibility and came back unanimously with indictments against Ford Motor Company for three counts of reckless homicide. 2 This was the first time a corporation had ever been indicted on criminal charges. Although a guilty verdict on the three charges of reckless homicide would only bring a $30,000 fine, Ford had much more at stake. A guilty verdict would hurt ford in many ways; it could encourage attorneys elsewhere to file criminal charges against Ford, it would erode consumer confidence in Ford, and would also be powerful evidence in subsequent civil suits. Because of what was at stake, Ford assembled a high priced legal team compared to the $20,000 that Consentino had to work with. Throughout the ten-week trial both sides argued the question 'Should Ford be held criminally liable for taking profit over lives'. After more than 25 hours of deliberation the jury came back with non-guilty verdict for Ford.2 The impact of the criminal trial and all the civil suits that Ford faced was far reaching. First of all it made manufacturers become more concerned with safety in their design. Bob Hunter, president of the National Insurance Consumers Organization, put it best "American manufactures didn't worry about safety until they were forced to consider it kicking and screaming". He says that there is absolute no question that lawsuits have led to safer car designs.4 It also showed that even if the product passes the minimum safety standards a manufacturer should hold safety concerns with the utmost importance.5 Lastly, it gave other attorneys confidence to file criminal charges against a manufacturer if they intentionally sell a harmful product. In conclusion I believe that Ford acted very irresponsible in the design of the Pinto and they should have been held accountable in both civil and criminal cases. They were foolish and morally wrong to take profits over peoples lives. Every engineer can learn a lot about how important product safety is by looking into this case. Bibliography: References: 1 Lee Patrick Strobel, "Reckless Homicide? Ford's Pinto Trail", 1980 , And Books. [LL] 2 Francis T. Cullen, "Corporate Crime Under Attack, The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond", 1987, Anderson Publishing. [LL] 3 Ellen Hochstedler, "Corporations as Criminals, Perspectives in Criminal Justice", 1984, Sage publications. [LL] 4 Paul Eisenstein, "Courts Give Crash Course in Car Design", The Engineer v 277 July 1, 1993 pg. 18. [EJ] 5 Charles J. Murry, "The Real Story Behind Car Fires", Design News v 48 1993 pg. 114-120. [EJ]

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