nt. They believed that the Arabs would not trade their relationship with the British by the Germans, and even if something drastic happens they can control it with their big army and many fleets in the area. The confidence in British power was changed in 1935. Mussolini had a great effect on the British power in Middle East. The Italian conquest of Ethiopia in 1935-1936 caused a series of problems for the British strategists and policy makers in the Middle East. These problems not only embarrassed the British superiority, but also put Britain in a great danger of losing the valuable Suez Canal, and the loyalty of the Arabs. Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia, or Abyssinia as it used to be called took British strategists completely by surprise. Although the British Mediterranean Fleet itself was supremely confident that it could defeat the Italian Fleet, the government's strategy was to defend against Germany and Japan, with no plans for hostility with Italy. Of the three potential enemies, Italy was considered the least threat to the British. In 1935, a confidential British inter-departmental report on interest in East Africa concluded that there was no important British interest in Abyssinia. The report added that British Empire could only be affected in a context of war with Italy. This train of thought continued through the start of the invasion of Italy. Three days after the attack of Mussolini, Amery told his Birmingham constituents that "I am not prepared to send a single Birmingham lad to his death for the sake of Abyssinia". Even though the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, gave a speech of support to the League, it is all known to be a bluff to scare Mussolini. It was not until the Hoare-Laval plan of December 1935 that seriously awakened and worried the Baldwin Government. This plan partitioned Ethiopia with nineteenth-century ideology. Italy was to have part of Ethiopia, and the other part was to be turned into a "zone...
