erican ships in the Pacific." (Cayton, Perry, Winkler, 1995, pg. 790)The United States also didn't want any more Americans soldiers to risk and lose their lives to fight the war. In a June 18, 1945, meeting, General Marshall told President Truman that the first 30 days of the invasion of Kyushu could result in 31,000 casualties. But Admiral Leahy pointed out that the huge invasion force could sustain losses proportional to those on Okinawa, making the operation much more costly. Had the Kyushu invasion failed to force Japan to surrender, the United States planned to invade the main island of Honshu, with the goal of capturing Tokyo. American deaths would have increased dramatically. Truman knew that Japan had some two million troops defending the home islands. He believed, along with the many Americans who would have had to invade Japan, that such a campaign might have become, in his words from June 18, 1945, "an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other." Added to the American losses would have been several times as many Japanese casualties, military and civilian. For Truman, even the lowest of the causality estimates was unacceptable. To prevent an invasion and to save as many lives as possible, he chose to use the atomic bomb. There were many of his advisors agreed with dropping the bomb and who pressured him into the bomb dropping. Here is what one of his military advisors had to say:"From a conference at Potsdam, President Truman issued an ultimatum to the Japanese government to 'proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces…, the alternative for Japan is prompt and udder destruction.' They rejected our ultimatum. The fault for what happens is theirs." (Presidential Advisers-Document Packet)Others did not agree, as shown below from another military advisor."The rejection of the Potsdam Declaration is not a valid reason for using the atomic bomb. We did not specifically tell them what 'utte...
