ocal: to 'reform' is to die." 14 Soon the two Kims and their economic planners are bound to confront sobering questions: whether a cautious, controlled economic opening would help answer their prayer, or whether the opening should be substantial, "analogous to the Chinese model, in order to bring in sufficient amounts of technology, capital, essential imports of machinery and oil and other needed goods, and to generate the exports to pay for much of those imports." 15 These questions clearly have implications for Pyongyang's political, military, and nuclear policies. Major shortcomings seen in Pyongyang's economic future will likely remain unresolved unless the two Kims come to realize that their future lies in trade and at least some interdependence with neighbors and the rest of the world. SOUTH KOREA AND THE MAJOR POWERSReconciliation with Seoul remains a central question for Pyongyang, but will be difficult, given the North's long history of ideological disdain for its archrival. Kim Il Sung's own dogma leaves no room for a separatist South Korea, and demands that in any case the South must be liberated first from U.S. occupation before it can join the North in a unified confederation. Not surprisingly, North Korea has tried to bend South Korea's agenda for inter-Korean reconciliation to suit its own. 16 Substantively, it can not bring itself to accommodate the much larger South Korea, condemning its agenda for peaceful coexistence as one tantamount to "criminal treason," anti-unification, and unforgivable subservience to foreign interests. In recent years, however, the North Korean regime has come a long way in recognizing that there is an established, robust regime in Seoul it has to reckon with. This is not surprising, given the regime's awareness of South Korea's relative power and its heightened concern about being "absorbed" by South Korea. Some believe that the more Pyongyang feels threatened, the greater the likelihood that ...
