n of the South and subsequent military adventurism. U.S. diplomats since 1988 have maintained low-level contacts with North Korean counterparts in Beijing to discuss possibilities for improving U.S.-DPRK relations. Through these contacts, Washington has stressed such policy interests as progress in a North-South Korean dialogue, including the need for Pyongyang's compliance with nuclear inspections; an end to acts of terrorism; cooperation in returning remains of American soldiers missing in action during the Korean War; respect for human rights; and a cessation of incendiary and misleading rhetoric against the United States. In January 1992, Washington had its first high-level meeting with North Korea to urge Pyongyang to allow its suspected nuclear-related facilities at Yongbyon to be inspected by the IAEA. The same concern was again the focus of high-level talks in June 1993.27 At the end of four rounds of talks on June 11, North Korea said that it would temporarily "suspend" its decision to withdraw from the NPT,28 but it still refused to agree to international inspections of its nuclear-related facilities. 29 For its part, the United States side gave "assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons"; and pledged to respect Pyongyang's "sovereignty" as well as its "internal affairs." In time, engagement might improve U.S.-North Korean relations. One way would be by promoting more nongovernmental educational, cultural, sports, and business contacts. Other steps could include: easing the U.S. trade embargo against the North;90 conditional suspension of the Team Spirit exercise; upgrading the existing inter-governmental channel of dialogue; and resumption of the gradual U.S. troop withdrawal from the South. While pursuing these steps on the basis of reciprocity, the United States would presumably remain committed to South Korea's security and, equally important, receive concrete assurances from Pyongyang to re...
