firms gain contracts in overseas projects despite its fears of possible environmental consequences. Such a policy would do little to discourage developing countries from accepting enormous environmental (and economic) risks. Imagining such risks as quantifiable entities, this policy would result in American firms rushing around the globe trying to “mitigate” environmental damage through incremental reductions in this stock of risk, rather than preventing risks from accumulating in the first place. The Clinton administration opted to take a stand against what it deemed to be a questionable undertaking. Though the true motivation behind the decision may be open to question, this policy potentially can serve as a basis for the prevention of poorly conceived and environmentally destructive projects. The critical factor is the contention that American leadership is needed to give an issue such as higher environmental standards the first push it needs to gain currency. Alternatively, American leadership is sometimes needed to prevent these issues from being excluded from the global dialogue. In other words, U.S. leadership is necessary both on the leading edge of the environmental movement and as a last line of defense against unbridled commercialism. In sum, the above examination of these issues leads us to conclude that the environment should matter in U.S. foreign policy, especially when the effects of environmental degradation cross national boundaries. Moreover, it should matter enough for U.S. government agencies to adopt environmental guidelines. Most importantly, the U.S. government should take unilateral measures particularly in instances when the environment should matter more. Recommendations We support the Clinton administration’s policy regarding the Three Gorges Dam despite the fact that the policy was largely a result of pressure from special interest groups, and as a trade-off for President Clinton’s br...