ook at it, the crimerate in California since the adoption of this law in Marchof 1994 has significantly decreased (Schafer, 1999). Thereis a wide range of percentages that are given to representthis decrease. One of the more conservative statisticsquotes a 26.9% decrease, or 815,000 crimes, since 1994(Schafer, 1999). Schafer presents his deterrent argumentstating that “[i]n the year prior to the law’s passage,California’s population of paroled felons increased by226....In the year after the law’s enactment, the number ofparoled felons plunged as 1,335 moved out of California”(1999: 7). Schafer conducted a survey of offenders to measure thespecific and general deterrence affects, if any. The surveyfound that seventy-eight percent of those surveyedunderstood the concept of the three strikes law. Schaferfound that “seventy percent said they would not or probablywould not commit the crime if they knew they would receivelife in prison, thus demonstrating a specific deterrenteffect” (1999: 9). When asked a similar question thatfocused on general deterrence, that number dropped to fortypercent, illustrating a weaker effect (1999: 9). WhileSchafer suggests that more studies similar to this oneshould be conducted in other states, this serves as a goodstarting point for assessing the deterrence effect. Schaferconcludes that three strikes laws should be addressed tooffenders in specific terms to maximize the deterrenteffect.The second opposing view to Walker’s proposition isSecretary of State Bill Jones’ report outlining the effectsof the law. Bill Jones is the author of the now famousthree strikes law. His report, more than likely a littleexaggerated, announces a thirty-eight percent decline inviolent crime since the passage of the three strikes law(Wood, 1999). He also estimates that approximately onemillion crimes have been prevented and $21.7 billion incosts associated to those ...
