e beginning to test theMexican market. The enactment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) andMexico's entrance into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ledinvestors to believe that Mexico had committed to a macroeconomic and fiscal conservatism thatwould continue well into the future.24 Indeed, much of the new confidence that internationalinvestors had in the Mexican economy was based on its continuity of macroeconomic policy.Investment bankers by definition do not like surprises, and the devaluation was certainly a surprise.For example, CS First Boston, a U.S. investment firm, believed in August 1994 that there was onlya 20 percent probability of Mexico enacting a maxi-devaluation.25 They arrived at this conclusionby polling a number of investment bankers in New York and London. The majority of those polledbelieved that Mexico would combat its high interest rates by gradually accelerating the pace of thepeso's daily devaluation rather than by a one-time devaluation.26 The remainder of the bankersthought that there was no imminent crisis and that the macroeconomic instability was merely atemporary result of the volatile election campaign. Everybody looked at Raul and Carlos Salinasde Gortari when this surprise came about.The pueblos low economic systemThis affected all Mexican citizens. The devaluation of the Peso was a nightmare for therich and the poor. This economical crisis was specially affecting the people who lived of thecommerce system. The selling of industrial cars went down a 70%.27 More than 10,000 of thestores in which people relied for financial support were closed and many were threatened by thevicious circle or paralyzed selling and unpayable debts. More than one million person were fired,and the the record of laid off people was reached of 13%.28 One didnt have to do much to see thecrisis; every day you can see more and more women on the streets selling own made goods...
