f the heavy losses we were inflicting on the enemy fighters, no decisive decrease in their numbers or in their fighting efficiency was noticeable (Mosley Battle 141). In the last few engagements over London, German pilots were told that no more than one-hundred British planes would engage, yet twice that number was reached within half of an hour of German engagement. Germany on September 9, 11, and 14 used about 200 bombers on the first set of bombing with smaller numbers on the latter two to raid London during the day. The Germans planned the heaviest bombing to occur on September 15th. Two elements of bombers headed for London and were soon met by more than 300 British aircrafts that were sent by Dowding. Germany was able to drop a significant amount of bombs on London comparable to September 7th, yet lost 60 bombers doing it. The lack of dominance by the Luftwaffe, the prominence of the RAF, and the lack of any clear victories forced Hitler to conclude on September 17, that air supremacy was lacking. He concluded that the Luftwaffe was not within measurable distance of creating the right conditions for invasion. Because of these overwhelming factors, Hitler postponed invasion indefinitely, dispersed his invasion fleet and halted the assembly of invasion craft (Collier 142-144). With the apparent halting of all plans to invade Britain, Goering would make a decision that would mark the end of the third phase and the start of the fourth phase of the Battle of Britain. With only mixed results and heavy losses to his squadrons, Goering abandons confrontational daylight bombing and cloaks his attacks under the cover of night. The fourth and final phase of the war began as Hitler called off Operation Sealion (Franks 108). The German Air Force decided to abandon daylight bombings for the costs were too great. This decision changed the coarse of the air war drastically. Goering's Luftwaffe was to abandon all bombings except at night (Mosley B...
