in momentum towards Germany and away from Britain. At the beginning, many big cities and London lay open to heavy German bombing. Until Britain started to implement nighttime defenses against Germany, the German raids were steady, deadly, and extremely effective (Mosley Battle 143). Britain had to do something to counteract the new Luftwaffe tactics. Along with the basic defenses they had set up around London, such as antiaircraft guns and spotlights, Churchill would employ a new type of defense. Herbert Agar wrote, "The new war, the war of the night fighters which Churchill named the 'wizard war' turned to England's advantage in a few months because the British wizards were better than the German ones" (Agar 128). By the time the new year had come, Croom Johnson, a London civilian in London commented on the morale in Britain when he said, "The prospect is considerably brighter than anyone would have dared to hope at the beginning of July. Unless we get knocked out in early springI don't see the war ending in 1941"(Agar 128-129). When Goering had first switched to night bombing, the idea that the enormous Luftwaffe could demoralize Britain was very probable, but by the end of the year, Goering could see that, "Within three months it was clear that they could not" (Agar 129). The British night defenses played a large part in the ultimate failure of the blitz, but a significantly larger part must be given to Goering. The demoralization of London was taking its effect on the East End of London. The blitz caused numerous homeless and dead and was creating an overpopulation endemic that was tearing the city apart. Had Goering continued the constant raids on, specifically the poor and homeless that was hurt the worst by the blitz, within months, he could have created a division between those punished and those not. This would have caused a possibly irreparable fissure between Britain's sense of unity, but because of Goering's eccentric tacti...
