made serious commitments to the Cuban exiles, promising to oppose communism at every opportunity, and supporting the overthrow of Castro. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy had frequently accused Eisenhower of not adequately handling the Castro situation. However, Kennedy was cautious, concerned that the size of the operation would threaten his ability to deny U.S. involvement with the exile brigade. He became increasingly worried that the role of the U.S. in the operation could no longer be concealed. Although Eisenhower, Kennedy and other high ranking U.S. officials denied any plans to attack Cuba, on October 31, 1960, Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa, in a session at the U.N. General Assembly, provided details on the recruitment and training of the Cuban exiles, whom he referred to as mercenaries and counterrevolutionaries. It was clear to Kennedy that Cuba knew an invasion was coming. Therefore, he changed the original plan, which called for a daytime landing at Trinidad, as well as extensive air strikes to weaken Castros counteroffensive. Kennedy thought the plan exposed the role of the United States too openly, and favored a nighttime landing at Bay of Pigs, which offered a suitable airstrip on the beach from which bombing raids could be operated. Once the bay was secured, the provisional Cuban government-in-arms set up by the CIA would be landed and immediately recognized by the U.S. The new government would request military support and a new intervention would take place. However, things did not turn out the way Kennedy hoped them to. On Sunday April 16, a team of frogmen went ashore and set up landing lights to guide the operation. The invading force consisted of 1,500 men divided into six battalions, with right-winger and CIA-friendly Manuel Artime as the political chief. Two battalions came ashore, where the razor-sharp coral reefs, earlier identified as merely seaweed, delayed the landing enough to e...
