.H.Q) had experience of small operations employing infantrylanding ships and assault and mechanized landing craft, there were now available also tank landingcraft which had not yet been under fire; and there had been no experience of what was involved inhandling a fleet of all these types in action. At this point the planning for the raid seemed a purelyBritish conception without any argument form other Allied force Commanders (Robertson, 72). Forthe main assault force, C.O.H.Q called upon the services of the 2nd Canadian Division, under the command of Major-General John Hamilton Roberts. The Canadian government knew its men werefrustrated and demoralized by inactivity, pressured the British government to send them into action atthe earliest opportunity-Dieppe (Whitehead, 65). While the Canadians were assembling and beginningtheir training in the Isle of Wight, detailed planning was proceeding in London, under the direction ofLord Louis Mountbatten, the three Force Commanders, and the General Montgomery. During thisphase the original outline plan was materially altered. The most important change was the mistake ofeliminating the heavy air bombardment. At the same time it was agreed that briefing of the plan shouldbe deferred until the last possible moment, which should not be until the operation is definitely aboutto take place. Naval and military commanding officers would however, be warned in the strictestconfidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take placeat short notice. The Commando side of the operation was to be separately planned which indicatedlack of conformity between the Commandos. The officers directing the two Commando landings wereto report to General Roberts at an early date and be responsible to him for their plans (Botting, 109). The plan for the raid, which finally bore the codename Operation Jubilee, evolved painfully, withmany alterations and disappointment at...
