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Dieppe

Dieppe At dawn of 19th August 1942, six thousand and one hundred Allied soldiers, of whom roughly five thousand were Canadians, landed at the French port of Dieppe in their first major test of the defence of the German-held coastline of Europe since Dunkirk. A combination of over-rigid planning, inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute bad luck inflicted on the Allies made the Dieppe raid one of their worst defeats in World War Two. The codename given to the operation was ‘Jubilee’ and its aim was to capture Dieppe to provide the Allied war planners with the vital information about the enemy preparedness for the Russians to relieve their sorely-pressed armies in the East. The Dieppe raid also served as a risky opportunity for Allied Forces to test their new invasion techniques and equipment with little experience. The Canadians who had been itching to get into action for two years, were flung into battle ill-prepared and scarcely armed, reduced to attempting to overcome concrete and barbed wire with little more than sheer courage. In nine hours of carnage and horror ‘Jubilee’ became a disaster. The plan for a raid on the port of Dieppe originated at Combined Operations Headquarters, London, in April 1942, the month, by Churchill’s direction, Lord Louis Mountbatten was given the title of Chief of Combined Operations. The German armies had plunged deeper into the Soviet union, and Russian losses were appalling; Stalin began exhorting Churchill to open a second front at the earliest possible moment and thereby relieve his hard-pressed armies. A great public clamour for supporting the Russians arose in Britain, Canada and the United States (Hunter, 57). It was considered important that there should be a raid to afford a test of the new technique and material which had been developed. A fairly considerable assault fleet was being built up, and although Combined Operations Headquarters (C.O.H.Q) had experience of small operations employing infantry landing ships and assault and mechanized landing craft, there were now available also tank landing craft which had not yet been under fire; and there had been no experience of what was involved in handling a fleet of all these types in action. At this point the planning for the raid seemed a purely British conception without any argument form other Allied force Commanders (Robertson, 72). For the main assault force, C.O.H.Q called upon the services of the 2nd Canadian Division, under the command of Major-General John Hamilton Roberts. The Canadian government knew its men were frustrated and demoralized by inactivity, pressured the British government to send them into action at the earliest opportunity-Dieppe (Whitehead, 65). While the Canadians were assembling and beginning their training in the Isle of Wight, detailed planning was proceeding in London, under the direction of Lord Louis Mountbatten, the three Force Commanders, and the General Montgomery. During this phase the original outline plan was materially altered. The most important change was the mistake of eliminating the heavy air bombardment. At the same time it was agreed that briefing of the plan should be deferred until the last possible moment, which should not be until the operation is definitely about to take place. Naval and military commanding officers would however, be warned in the strictest confidence that an emergency operation is being planned for August and may be ordered to take place at short notice. The Commando side of the operation was to be separately planned which indicated lack of conformity between the Commandos. The officers directing the two Commando landings were to report to General Roberts at an early date and be responsible to him for their plans (Botting, 109). The plan for the raid, which finally bore the codename Operation Jubilee, evolved painfully, with many alterations and disappointment at the side of the soldiers, as spring gave away to summer. Through the late hours of August 18, 1942, the Allied strike force steamed across the English channel The plan called for attacks at five different points on a front of roughly 16 kilometres. Four simultaneous flank attacks were to go in just before dawn, followed half an hour later by the main attack on the town of Dieppe itself (see figure 3). As the assault force approached the coast of France in the early hours of August 19, the landing craft of the eastern sector unexpectedly encountered a small German convoy. Its movements were earlier reflected on the radar in England and two warning signals were accordingly sent out. These had no effect, although they were received by at least some of the vessel of the Allied forces. The noise of the sharp violent sea fight which followed alerted coastal defences, particularly at Berneval and Puys, leaving little chance of success in this sector. The craft carrying No.3 Commando were scattered and most of the unit never reached shore. Due to inaccurate reporting Lt. Col. Durnford-Slater, after reporting to General Roberts on the headquarters ship off Dieppe, returned to England without knowing that seven of his twenty-three crafts landed their troops. These troops were quickly overwhelmed without their leader. One small party of twenty commandos managed to get within hundred and eighty metres of the battery and by accurate snipping prevented the guns from firing on the assault ships for two-and-one-half hours before they were safely evacuated At Puys the Royal Regiment of Canada shared in the ill-fortune where German soldiers were strategically placed at narrow and lofty cliffs. Success depended on surprise and darkness, neither of which prevailed as the naval landing was delayed; the Royals leapt ashore in the growing light to meet violent machine-gun fire from the fully-alerted German soldiers (see figure 4). Only a few men were able to get over the heavily wired seawall at the head of the beach; those who did were unable to get back due to deficient back up or firepower. The rest of the troops, together with three platoons of reinforcements from the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, were pinned on the beach by mortar and machine-gun fire, and were later of their wounds; the rest were taken prisoner. Failure to clear the eastern headland enabled the Germans to enfilade the Dieppe beaches and nullify the main frontal attack (History). In the western sector, meanwhile, some degree of surprise was achieved by the No.4 commando which was the only one according to plan, and successfully destroyed the guns in the battery near Varengeville, and then withdrew safely (Stacey, 327). At Pourville, some degree of surprise was also achieved, and initial opposition was light as the South Saskatchewan Regiment and Queen’s own Cameron Highlanders of Canada assaulted the beaches. Resistance stiffened as they crossed the River Scie and pushed towards Dieppe proper. Heavy fighting then developed and the Saskatchewans, and the Camerons who supported them, were stopped well short of the town. The main force of the Camerons, meanwhile, pushed on towards their objective, an inland airfield, and advanced some three kilometres before they too were forced to halt. During the withdrawal the enemy was able to bring fierce fire to bear upon the beach from dominating positions east of Pourville, and also from the high ground to the west. However, the landing craft came in through the storm of fire with support by a rearguard, the greater part of both units successfully re- embarked though many of the men were wounded. The rearguard itself could not be brought off and, when ammunition ran out and further evacuation was impossible, surrendered. The air attack made across the pebble beach in front of Dieppe was timed to take place a half-hour later than the flanks but were earlier than planned. German soldiers, concealed in cliff top positions and in buildings overlooking the promenade waited, as the men of the Essex Scottish Regiment assaulted the open eastern section, the enemy swept the beach with machine-gun fire. All attempts to breach the seawall were beaten back with grievous loss. When one small party managed to infiltrate the town, a misleading message was received aboard the headquarters’ ship which suggested that the Essex Scottish Regiment were making headway. Thus, the reserve battalion Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was sent in. They, like their comrades who had landed earlier, found themselves pinned down on the beach and exposed to intense enemy fire with just 4-inch guns to compete with.. The Royal Hamilton Light infantry landed at the west end of the promenade opposite a large isolated casino. They were able to clear this strongly-held building and the nearby pillboxes and some men of the battalion got across the bullet-swept boulevard and into the town, where they were engaged in vicious street fight (Mellor, 180). Misfortune also attended the landing of the tanks of the Calgary Regiment. Timed to follow an air and naval bombardment, they were put ashore ten to fifteen minutes late, thus leaving the infantry without support during the first critical minutes of the attack. Then as the tanks came ashore, they met an inferno of fire and were brought to a halt not only by enemy guns, but also by the shingle banks and seawall. Those that negotiated the seawall found their way blocked by concrete obstacles which sealed off the narrow streets. Nevertheless, the immobilized tanks continued to fight, supporting the infantry and contributing greatly to the withdrawal of many of them; the tank crew became prisoners or died in battle(Atkin, 178) (see figure 2). By early afternoon, Operation Jubilee was over. The casualties suffered by the Canadian military force were extremely heavy. In all categories they totalled 3367 all ranks. No fewer than 1946 Canadian officers and men became prisoners of war, at least 568 of them wounded. At Dieppe, from a force of roughly 5000 men engaged for only nine hours, the Canadian Army lost more prisoners than in the whole eleven months of the later campaign in North-West Europe (Canada) (see figure 1). Conflicting assessments of the value of the raid continue to be presented. Some claim that it was a useless slaughter; others maintain that it was necessary to the successful invasion of the continent two years later on D-Day. The enemy was astonished that, inspite of a generally accurate knowledge of his defences, the Allied forces attempted an assault on an area strong both by nature and by art, with weapons which were inadequate for the task. The Allied intelligence on the whole was excellent but there was a general lack of knowledge as to the location of regimental and battalion command posts. Other information not easily available from air reconnaissance was also lacking; notably, although their maps showed numerous pillboxes along the main Dieppe beach, there was no indication of their armament or of the presence of beach-defence or anti-tank guns. The German comments chiefly emphasized the insufficiency of the support given the assaulting infantry (Dieppe Raid). Also by the time of Dieppe raid, accordingly, the German Army in the West had been greatly strengthened and was in a full alert, expecting at any moment what might be major Allied enterprise. During the first half of August Hitler ordered the construction of what came to be called the Atlantic Wall (Atkin, 282). The decision to eliminate the attack by heavy bombers, recommended in the first instance by the Air Force Commander and concurred in the Military Force Commander, was supported by arguments of some strength. General Roberts was told that the RAF night bombers were quite incapable of hitting with accuracy such a small target as the buildings fronting the sea at Dieppe, and the United States day bomber force in U.K. was still in its infancy (it made its first small raid two days before the Dieppe operation). But the decision removed from the plan the one element of really heavy support contained in it. The assault as a result was backed by nothing more powerful than 4-inch guns and Boston bombers (Villa, 126). Surprise, rather than striking power, was chief reliance in this operation; yet no surprise could be hoped for in the frontal attack, which was to go in half an hour later than those on the flanks. As the heavy air support have been removed from the plan, heavy naval support was not substituted. After the operation, the Naval Force Commander reported that he was satisfied that a capital ship could have operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk, and would probably have turned the tide ashore in their favour. The planners also never asked for an old battleship to provide fire support because the Admiralty policy at this period was opposed to risking capital ships in the narrow waters of the channel that it was considered useless to make the request (Botting, 217). The three Force Commanders inherited a plan already made and were concerned mainly with detail, although they shared the responsibility for the basic decision to eliminate the bomber attack. So far as any one individual had general authority over the operation, it was the Chief of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten; but obviously even his powers were circumscribed. The fact is that the Dieppe plan was the work of a large and somewhat indefinitely composed committee, whose composition, moreover, changed steadily as the planning proceeded. A simpler organization and a greater concentration of responsibility would have been more likely to result in a sound plan (Robertson, 173). C.O.H.Q produced a bulky report incorporating ‘lessons learned’ which suggested that overwhelming fire power, including close support, during the initial stages of the attack was necessary; in addition for flexibility in the military plan and its execution. Finally, Dieppe killed the always dubious idea of frontal attack of a major fortified port, was hazardous In conclusion, the Dieppe raid was an ill-prepared rehearsal for the second front and in almost every respect a failure for the Allies. While planning for the raid the Combined Operations Headquarters made blundering decisions of eliminating heavy bombardment both air and naval; and briefing the plan to the force until the last possible moment also foreboded the raid to go according to plan. Firepower given to the soldiers was not adequate at all for the mission they were assigned to accomplish against German machine-guns at terrible geographical landing. Although the planners had some knowledge of the German defences at Dieppe they did not have a specific view of the location and their ammunition. Finally, the main reason for the raid to become a failure was the inefficient reporting along with ill-fortune suffered by the Allied forces which came to a great loss in the end. Dieppe is the most memorable events of the Second World War, for Canadians in particular as their Bibliography: Atkin, Ronald. Dieppe 1942: The Jubilee Disaster. Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1980. Botting, Douglas. World War II: The Second Front. Toronto: Time-Life Books Inc., 1978. “Canada and WWII”. Veteran’s Affairs Canada. n.pag. Veteran’s Affairs Canada online. Online. Internet. Available: www.vac-acc.gc.ca/general/subicfm?source=secondwar/canada2 “Canada’s Role in WWII.” n.pag. Online. Interent. Available: http://www.aci.mta.ca/projects/courage_remebered/canadasroleinwwii.html “Dieppe”. In Desperate Battle: Normandy 1944. 22 April 1998: n. pag. Valour and Horror Online. Online. Internet. Available: www.valourandhorror.com/DB/Back/Dieppe.htm “Dieppe Raid: Operation Jubilee.” The British CommonWealth Campaigns of WWII. n.pag. Online. Internet. Available: http://www.britishforces.com/world_war2/campaigns/dieppe.html “History.” The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada. n.pag. Online. Internet. Available: www.blackwatchcanada.com/en/about.htm#history Hunter, T. Murray. Canada at Dieppe. Ottawa: Balmur book Publishing LTD., 1982. Mellor, John. Forgotten Heroes: The Canadians at Dieppe. Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1975. “Raid on Dieppe (Naval Operations)”. Warships1.com. 1997: n.pag. Warships1.com online. Online. Internet. Available: www.warship1.com/W-hist/HS11Dieppe3.htm Robertson, Terrence. The Shame and the Glory: Dieppe. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1962. Souster, Raymond. Jubilee of Death: The Raid on Dieppe. Ottawa: Oberon Press Publishing, 1984. Stacey, C.P. Colonal, et al. Official history of Canadian Army in the Second worl War: Volume I. Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, 1957. “Turning the Tide: 1939 to D-Day.” Macartney, Terence. National Film Board of Canada. 1995. Tute, Warren, et al. D Day. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Whitehead, William. Dieppe 1942: Echoes of Disaster. Toronto: Personal Library Publishing, 1976. Villa, Brian Loring. Unauthorized Action: Mountbatten and the Dieppe Raid. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990.

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