Data Bases • Custom Term Papers • Free Term Papers • Free Research Papers • Free Essays • Free Book Reports • Plagiarism? Links • Top 100 Term Paper Sites • Top 25 Essay Sites • Top 50 Essay Sites • Search 97,000 Papers @ DirectEssays.com • Search 101,000 Papers @ ExampleEssays.com • Search 90,000 Papers @ MegaEssays.com Free Essays • Term Paper Sites • Chuck III's Free Essays • Free College Essays • TermPaperSites.com • My Term Papers • Get Free Essays • Essay World • Planet Papers	Search Lots of Essays Back to Subjects - History Other Guadalcanal Guadalcanal As war raged on in Europe, the United States remained on the sidelines supplying only aid to allied countries. The greatest threat at that time was considered to be Hitler and his German war machine. But on December 7 1941 this idea would drastically change. On this date the island of Pearl Harbor was hit by a surprise attack from Japanese naval and air forces. The Japanese managed to drastically cripple the U.S. Pacific fleet, and had the Pacific carriers been present, the Japanese might have even been able to change the course of the war. This disaster, which enraged the American public, sparked a Declaration of war towards Japan and the other Axis powers. This intern marked the United States formal entry into World War II. Shortly after this incident, Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the U.S. fleet, met with British leaders for the first joint conference, given the code name “Arcadia.” This conference was to reaffirm America’s stance in fighting the European front first and the Pacific front as merely a defensive position. This defensive position was stated as defending “vital interests”, however it was relatively vague. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was given the order by Admiral King to protect the U.S.-Australian sea-lanes. This was to be accomplished chiefly by securing the line between Hawaii and the Samoa islands with an extension to the Fiji islands. However this task was not considered high priority and simply “needed to be accomplished” at the earliest possible date. At this same time Japan was expanding their Pacific Empire at an alarming rate over a vast area. This caused military leaders to rethink their view on the pacific front. During the first five months of 1942 all branches of the service argued amongst each other about what was needed to defend the Pacific. Many of the top military leaders saw the European front as a more urgent situation. General Eisenhower’s team saw the Pacific theatre as merely a defensive task. Their opinion was that the Japanese would attack the oil rich Indies and stop at that. Eisenhower was quoted as stating, “We’ve got to go to Europe and fight, We’ve got to quit wasting resources all over the world- and still worse- wasting time.”(Frank pg.9) Soon the Navy sent Marine reinforcements to strengthen Samoa. The Army then sent 1500 troops to Canton Island and 2000 troops to Christmas Island, both part of the Atolls island chain. Admiral King then decided to establish a refueling base at Bora-Bora to support the vast number of troops deployed on various islands. When 17000 men were sent to New Caledonia, the Army began to feel it’s first strains on it’s resources. However, the Navy still demanded more island strong points in the Pacific. The Army insisted that no more than the minimum number of islands be secured and that none should receive more than the minimum garrison required to defend it. This buildup was partly due to the British prediction that the Japanese would next target the Fiji and New Caledonia islands. Debate slowly started to lean in favor of Admiral King’s campaign to expand efforts in the South Pacific. In late January President Roosevelt sent troops to defend New Zealand and Australia at their request, followed by the carrier battle group centered around the Lexington. The most serious threat at hand was still the defense of the pacific sea-lanes and on February 15th the Yorktown battle group was sent to the pacific theatre as well. Even though military leaders were still somewhat cautious at this time, the Average American, despite Hitler’s threat, regarded Japan with distrust, Hatred, and fear and would not tolerate a policy of Idleness in the Pacific theatre after Pearl Harbor. The plight of the pacific region was constantly an argument between Army and Navy leaders, intern General MacArthur was given command of the Southwest Pacific area which included mainly Australia and the Phillipines. Admiral Nimitz was consequentially given command over the remainder of the region stretching back to the east. This boundary was later to be moved one degree West so that Guadalcanal would fall under Nimitz’s control when battle was imminent. On April 1, President Roosevelt received the “Marshall Memorandum”, which was essentially a document, which called for a distinct choice between security in the Pacific and an early offensive in Europe. Marshall believed that prompt American action was essential to prevent defeat in the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Basically Marshall was in favor of fighting the European front, and wanted a commitment by the United States to do the same. At first the British were in favor of King’s campaign in the Pacific but then decided in favor of the Marshall Plan when the Japanese’s intentions of merely raiding and not landing became clear. This basically ended British interests in the Pacific even though the debates raged on. Many opinions changed however on May 3 when the Japanese captured the island of Tulagi, which boarders Guadalcanal just to the north. Immediately Nimitz proposed a strike to halt the Japanese advance, but MacArthur quickly objected on the grounds that he had no forces available to hold Tulagi. The Japanese advance was brought to a stand still later at the battles of Coral Sea and Midway, thanks to American code breakers. At the battle of Midway specifically the Japanese suffered a large defeat and a large amount of their air power was diminished. At this same point in time, the Australian Navy had been operating its’ Coastwatchers system which was especially helpful during the war. The Coastwatchers consisted of local natives from the various islands and Australian Navy personnel. Basically these natives reported any Japanese activity to their superiors who then relayed this information by radio back to headquarters. It was essentially a basic form of intelligence. On June 13, Japan decided to establish an airbase on Guadalcanal to strengthen the outer perimeter of their advance. During the same time span the United States also realized the strategic importance of Guadalcanal and was in the planning stages of building an airfield as well. On June 24, King directed Nimitz to prepare to capture Tulagi and adjacent positions. In the days that soon followed, American intelligence concluded that the Japanese had landed airfield construction troops on Guadalcanal. Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B. Twining and Major William McKean soon reinforced this conclusion when they spotted an airfield under construction on Guadalcanal while flying a reconnaissance mission in their B-17 on the 17th of July. The Navy acted fast and operation “Watchtower” soon came into to being. The landing force was composed of the 1st Marine Division under the command of Major General Alexander Archer Vandegrift, and their job was the same as it always was, to take control of Guadalcanal and it’s sister island Tulagi. Meanwhile the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal were mostly construction workers and a small force of flying boats off the coast. Unknown to the Japanese, the U.S. convoy had managed to slip right upon the Japanese position shielded by cloud cover. Around 0600 on the morning of August 7, Japanese construction workers and the other various soldiers awoke to the blasts of naval gunfire from off the coast. Grumman F4F-4 Wildcats from the carrier Wasp followed soon after and quickly destroyed the little air opposition the Japanese had, which left them very vulnerable. After softening the beachhead, the Marines were ready to invade. Men sprawled down cargo nets from troop transports into landing craft and headed for Beach Red, a strip of beach near the Tenaru River designated earlier. Expecting to hit the beach fighting, the Marines were shocked to find absolutely no opposition and they soon found themselves dulling machetes as they tromped through dense jungle growth. The nearby by island of Tulagi was also part of the invasion and the Marines had perhaps more resistance here than on Guadalcanal. Composed of 1st Raider Battalion and 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, the landing force for Tulagi embarked on a southern strip of beach and worked their way east to the main Japanese position. However these Marines were traveling light, because they weren’t carrying very much food. “Don’t worry about food,” their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Merrit A. Edson, told one company commander. “There’s plenty there. Japs eat, too. All you have to do is get it.”(Frank pg.73) The fighting on Tulagi was fierce but did not last long and the Marines had soon secured the island, and recovered plenty of food abandoned by the Japanese. At this same time Admiral Yamamoto was receiving word that his forces on Guadalcanal and Tulagi were being slaughtered and he soon sent nearby air reinforcements from Rabaul and New Guinea. High level bombers arrived around 1315 but heavy cloud cover prevents them doing even mild damage to American forces. Around 1500 nine Japanese dive-bombers arrived. The dive-bombers manage to damage a destroyer, but in the end only three crews make it back to Rabaul. On Guadalcanal, the 1st Division was dispersed roughly one mile from their starting point when they decided to settle in for the night. The first night ashore was a harrowing experience for the young Marines, as many had not even seen the enemy yet. Very little sleep was had by that night for fear that the Japanese lay waiting in the jungle. On the morning of August 8, ground crews at Rabaul tended to the small number of operational planes that would be launched in attempt to take out supply ships in order to cut off the Marines. The Japanese torpedo bombers came gliding in just 20 to 40 feet above the water keeping in sink with tactics that were successful earlier in the war, but instead this time they were met with much heavier weapons including 20mm antiaircraft machine guns. Plane after plane burst into flames and flailed into the sea. One bomber put a torpedo into the bow of the destroyer Jarvis causing severe damage, and one other managed to crash itself into the transport George S. Elliot. This caused a raging fire and the transport was soon scuttled in shallow water. Ashore, Vandegrift defined the line of the Lunga River as the Marine objective for August 8. Colonel Cates redirected one of his battalions towards the new objective, but it still found heavy going in the dense growth. Cates’s two remaining battalions retraced their path back to the shore and marched down the beach to the new line. The 5th Marines enjoyed much more favorable terrain, consisting of flat coconut plains along the shore, and after scattered resistance, had seized the airfield around 1600. The Marines were amazed to find that almost all of the Japanese supplies lay intact, and only a few bodies were left over from the naval bombardment. To this day it is still a mystery why the Japanese did not establish any form of organized resistance around the airfield. As the Marines settled in for their second night on Guadalcanal, the situation appeared well in hand, at least for the time being. When Vice Admiral Mikawa learned of Guadalcanal, he immediately pulled together every warship at his disposal and headed south from Rabaul. He arrived off of the southern shore of Savo Island in the small hours of the morning of August 9th. Ahead of him were several groups of allied warships, their crews exhausted from days of continuous combat operations. Due to the three entrances to the soon-to-be-infamous Ironbottom Sound, the allied forces were compelled to divide their strength into three patrolling squadrons: Southern, Northern, and Eastern. The Allied vessels were unalert, and their commanders were in some cases either asleep or away from the actual scene of action. Beyond the Allied warships lay a transport anchorage off of Lunga Point whose merchant vessels were still packed with equipment intended for the Marines ashore. The stage was set for the most humiliating defeat ever inflicted upon the US Navy. Mikawa’s ships slipped unseen past the destroyer pickets at the mouth of the sound, and soon came upon the Southern group of Allied warships; two heavy cruisers (HMAS Canberra and USS Chicago) and two destroyers. True to standard Japanese tactics, Mikawa’s force first launched torpedoes and then followed up with devastating salvos of 8- and 6-inch gunfire. Canberra was in a sinking condition almost before she was aware that a battle had been joined. Chicago fared slightly better (she wasn’t sunk), but never properly got into action, and (even worse) never alerted the Northern Force as to the presence of Mikawa’s squadron. Fifteen minutes later, curving northward around Savo Island’s Eastern Shore, the Japanese came upon the Northern Force, still steaming sedately along in a box patrol pattern. Mikawa’s forces had become divided in the earlier exchange, and by chance enveloped the Allied Northern force from both sides. Taken unaware, and caught in a devastating crossfire, Northern Force’s three heavy cruisers, Vincennes, Quincy, and Astoria, were quickly gunned into sinking hulks. At this point, having slaughtered the allied escorts, the transport anchorage behind him lay open for Mikawa’s taking. But the Japanese admiral’s position was not as favorable as he would have wished. He had no idea that the US carriers (under Admiral Fletcher) covering the invasion had been withdrawn from the general vicinity. Attacking the transport anchorage would require his slowing, reassembling his scattered squadron, coming about, finding the anchorage, and then attacking it. It was now close to 2:00 AM. An attack on the anchorage, according to Mikawa’s staff officers, would have added nearly two hours to the operation, placing Mikawa’s force in a dangerous position when dawn broke at around 0400. Further, Mikawa had no idea as to what Allied vessels still remained untouched in the sound. Consequently, shortly after 0200, he ordered a general retirement up The Slot. Ironically, having survived the fray around Savo, Kako fell victim to three torpedoes from the American submarine S-44 as a portion of the Japanese force approached the safety of Kavieng the next day. Thus ending the first installment in a series of grim night battles around Guadalcanal. It was a spectacular tactical victory for the Japanese, but it was also shorn of the strategic advantage it might have achieved. After learning of the Marines taking the airfield, the Japanese high command quickly decides on a new plan of action. They pick Colonel Ichiki, the man who was originally scheduled to take Midway had a naval engagement there permitted a troop landing, to retake Guadalcanal. On August 12th, the airstrip at Guadalcanal is named Henderson Field in Honor of a fallen hero from the battle of Midway, Major Lofton Henderson. The field is declared ready for service but unfortunately no American aircraft are available for assignment here. Japanese aircraft, however, are making almost daily use of the field as a bombing target. On August the 19th, Japanese destroyers deposit Ichiki and his advance-echelon troops at Guadalcanal at 0100 in the morning. Landing is made at this early hour to avoid harassment by the fliers of Henderson field. The Japanese are unaware that no American aircraft have yet arrived at the airfield. The colonel and his 900 troops land undetected and begin their march toward the airport without waiting for the additional troops that are following a few days behind. They make it to a tidal lagoon known as Alligator Creek where they encounter the U.S. 1st Marine Division. There, a furious battle ensues and the Japanese are quickly and completely annihilated. So crushing is their defeat that Colonel Ichiki, and many of his staff committed suicide in order to redeem their honor. This has the unfortunate consequence that his few remaining troops are left without officers to lead them. Eight days after the naming of Henderson field, the escort carrier Long Island launches 19 F4F and 12 SBD aircraft from 190 miles south of Guadalcanal. By late afternoon the marines at Gaudalcanal hear the distant drone of aircraft engines and for the first time see planes other than Japanese as the Dauntlesses and Wildcats arrive landing in clouds of dust. Pilots and crews are taken back by the wild joy of the marines who toss their helmets in the air and cheer. Younger Marines shed tears and old timers are not ashamed of their moist eyes. No event in this campaign does as much to boost the morale as this arrival of the first American planes. The Japanese decide to capitalize on their victory at Savo Island by sending down an armada to wipe out the remnants of the U.S. Navy and at the same time reinforce their remaining land troops that are now few in number and of limited effectiveness. But this time, the Japanese are not so lucky at sea. The U.S. Navy is able to regain some of its prestige by sinking one of their aircraft carriers, a destroyer, and a large troop transport while seriously damaging a cruiser. This victory is accomplished largely by the outstanding performance of U.S. airmen. This is to be known the battle of the Eastern Solomons and credit for the victory goes to Admiral Scott. American losses include damage to the aircraft carrier Enterprise forcing its return to Pearl Harbor for repairs. This victory keeps the Japanese from landing the troops necessary to start a major drive to retake Henderson Field. On August 28th the Japanese bounce back and again attempt to land troops this time by the use of destroyers. The destroyers however must accomplish their mission during the hours of darkness to avoid the planes of Henderson Field. This attempt, costs them one destroyer sunk and two damaged. Undaunted, further attempts are made using this method and by the end of the month the Japanese succeed in bringing enough soldiers to the island to enable a major assault at the time of their choosing. Having learned the hard way that the Marines are not going to be a pushover, the Japanese take their time and plan carefully. Their buildup continues through the early days of September and the date of the next attack is set for September 12th. On this date, another crucial attempt to take the airfield will be made under the command of Major General Kawaguchi. Kawaguchi was originally scheduled to land and take Fiji Islands in July but the defeat at Midway placed him there on the last day in August. With the general came 1,200 fresh soldiers delivered by destroyer convoy. Counting the troops shuttled in earlier by destroyers, his force reached 6,200 strong. Kawaguchi felt confident that this would be more than enough men to retake the airfield, at what was to be called The Battle of Edson’s Ridge. The Japanese troops soon hurled themselves at the Marines with devastating losses to both sides. Heroic efforts by Marine, Navy, and Army Air Forces along with superb Marine ground fighting stopped Kawaguchi at the perimeter of the airfield. He then pointed his command group at the ridge, but he too found the terrain so difficult that he sidestepped west to the Lunga River and began to wade north up the streambed itself. When the depth and current became too much, the general crawled out of the water onto the east bank near dawn. There he issued orders for his fragmented command to reassemble for a new effort the night of the 13th. The muddy, wet, and mad general’s exasperation was intense; he reported that “because of the devilish jungle, the brigade was scattered all over and completely beyond control. In my whole life I have never felt so helpless.” (Zimmerman pg.114) His mood did not improve during the day when American bombing and shelling smashed his communications equipment. Up to this point, the Japanese High Command still believed that the airfield was going to be taken and a unit of zero fighters was held on standby waiting to land at the airfield as soon as confirmation of the victory had been received. On September 15th, Kawaguchi’s battle report reached the 17th Army’s High Command with the admission that the attack had been a costly failure. This news created severe shock and incredulity. Emperor Hirohito was informed of the defeat. Imperial General Headquarters made a crucial decision. It was clear that at this remote island a decisive battle would have to be fought, therefore decisive forces would have to be committed. The Imperial Headquarters, the Combined Fleet, and the Japanese 17th Army meshed a plan that recognized that Guadalcanal could be the pivotal battle of the war and that a total commitment must be made. The Japanese set everything in motion for a major offensive. Although the defeat of Kawaguchi was considered a great victory for the Americans, it was costly and the Marines were in desperate need of supplies and reinforcements. Accordingly, Admiral Turner landed the 7th Marines at Guadalcanal but at the loss of the U.S. aircraft carrier Wasp, torpedoed while supporting the landing operation. The same spread of torpedoes sank a destroyer and damaged the battleship North Carolina sending it back to the States for repair. Nonetheless, over 4000 troops with supplies landed to bolster the marine position. However, U.S. Naval strength was at a precarious level and the Navy’s ability to protect the Marines on shore was questionable. The night of October 11, 9142, a U.S. task force commanded by Rear Admiral Norman Scott was standing off the entrance to Ironbottom Sound. His mission was to screen the Sound from possible intrusion by any Japanese bombardment forces. As it happened, such a Japanese group, commanded by, Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, was approaching the entrance to the Sound at around midnight. Scott's battle plan was simple. He knew that his force could not hope to match the night tactics of his adversaries. Instead, he would keep his ships in line-ahead formation, using the destroyers to illuminate targets, and his cruisers to neutralize the opponent with gunfire. His two light cruisers, Boise and Helena, each sported fifteen 6" guns, and could pump out prodigious quantities of shells. Unfortunately, Scott's choice of flagship, the heavy cruiser San Francisco, while nominally the more powerful vessel than either of his CLs, had an inferior radar suite. Helena detected the approaching Japanese force on radar at 2325, but owing to Scott's distrust of the information he was receiving from San Francisco's set, he first executed a 180-degree turnabout, and then allowed the range to close to perilous proximity before opening fire. As a result, two of his destroyers fell out of formation, and found themselves between the Japanese and US main bodies when firing commenced. The Japanese force was taken largely by surprise. However, the Japanese vessels quickly realized that Scott had crossed their 'T', and executed individual turns to port and starboard to clear the area. The flagship Aoba was hit hard early on, and Admiral Goto was mortally wounded in the opening moments. Seeing the Aoba in distress, the captain of Furutaka swerved to interpose his vessel between the American force and the flagship. It was to prove her undoing, as she was buried in an avalanche of 6" fire. Destroyer Fubuki, sailing in the van, was also quickly gunned into submission. The Japanese fled as best they could back up The Slot, with the Americans breaking off the pursuit at 0245. The Americans had not come away unscathed. Destroyer Duncan, finding herself between the two main forces, had closed the Japanese and attempted to attack with torpedoes. She was heavily hit in the process, by both Japanese and American shells, and would eventually sink. More important, Boise sustained a pair of 8" hits which detonated her forward 6" ready ammunition, killing practically everyone in turrets #1 and #2. Fortunately, her magazine crews had scrupulously kept a minimum of ammunition and powder exposed, meaning that while they paid with their lives, the lives of their shipmates were spared from a more catastrophic explosion. The net result was another flawed victory, this time for the Americans. Given their numerical advantage, the element of surprise, and their superior tactical position, they ought to have inflicted heavier casualties on the Japanese. Instead, they had sunk a cruiser and a destroyer, at the cost of a destroyer sunk and a very valuable light cruiser badly damaged. More important, this half victory did nothing to dissuade the Americans from their linear, line-ahead tactics, which would have importance in later fights. Superior gunfire had won the day here, but the Japanese torpedo was the mightier nighttime weapon still, and linear gun-line tactics invited disaster from torpedo-armed craft. By early November, nearly 3000 Army troops as well as 200 Marine air wing personnel had arrived at Guadalcanal. Although described by the phrase, “weakness in discipline and professionalism closely linked to amateurism and superannuation among the officers,” the 164th infantry regiment was a relief in some aspects. The Japanese had also finally come to two important (if belated) realizations: one, that the Americans had far more troops on Guadalcanal than earlier estimates had indicated, and two, Henderson Field had to be neutralized in order for the Japanese to control the seas around the island. Consequently, on November 11th, the Japanese assembled a large convoy of merchant vessels, loaded with enough supplies and ammunition for a month's worth of fighting. And in order to assure the delivery of those supplies, they assembled a very powerful force, centered on the battleships Hiei and Kirishima, whose job would be to bombard Henderson Field into impotence. Around 1:00 AM on the 13th, this bombardment force entered Ironbottom Sound. Waiting for them was an American force of heavy and light cruisers, and destroyers. The Japanese force had fallen into disarray during the night's steaming through rainsqualls. The American formation, under Rear Admiral Daniel Callaghan, was hampered by poor radio discipline, and the fact that an American commander had once again decided to hoist his flag in a vessel with inferior sensors. As a result, even when the Japanese force was detected on radar, Callaghan suffered from a murky perception as to their composition, speed, and course. His attempt to cross the Japanese 'T' instead placed his ships on a collision course with the enemy. By the time fighting commenced at 0148, the range between the leading elements of each force had closed to a ludicrous 1000 yards. The result was a point-blank brawl of monstrous proportions as both formations passed through each other. Damage was severe on both sides, with the Americans getting the worse end of the deal. However, the Japanese bombardment mission was foiled, which spelled doom for the Hiei the next morning as she tried to struggle back up The Slot. More important, neither side was willing to give up the struggle to maintain control over the Sound, and thereby deny supply to the other side's land forces. The stage was set for another brutal battle just two nights later. Having lost practically every cruiser in the inventory either sunk or damaged, the American forces left to dispute Japan's ability to reinforce Guadalcanal were running thin. As the damaged survivors of the Battle of Friday the Thirteenth withdrew, the Americans knew that the Japanese were moving another force into the area. The American theatre commander, William Halsey, reacted by detaching the fast battleships of Enterprise's screen to the constricted waters of the Sound. Under the command of Rear Admiral Willis Lee, the South Dakota and Washington, along with a nominal screen of four destroyers, arrived off of Savo on November 14. Down from the north came another Japanese force bent on bombarding Henderson Field. The Kirishima, a survivor of the battle two nights before, along with heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, formed the bulk of the force. In the resulting melee, South Dakota had a bad go of it, repeatedly losing power due to faulty electrical equipment, and was unable to contribute much to the battle. Taken under fire by Kirishima and practically every ship in the Japanese main body, her superstructure was riddled and her radar disabled. However, her watertight integrity was never damaged a whit. And in the meantime, Washington had approached undetected to within 8,400 yards of the Japanese force. Taking Kirishima under fire at 0005, she quickly buried the Japanese battlewagon under an avalanche of 16" and 5" fire. By 0012 she was a floating wreck. Washington proceeded to sink Ayanami, and then began a gradual disengagement from the action, avoiding several torpedo attacks in the process. For the Japanese, it was the end of any hope of wrestling Guadalcanal from the Americans; in the course of three days of constant fighting in and around the area, they had lost two battleships, one heavy cruiser, three destroyers and eleven combat transports, not to mention 5,000 infantrymen drowned, and several thousand naval casualties. From this point on, the Japanese would never stop retreating in the Pacific. Having made the decision to abandon Guadalcanal, the Japanese were left to perform the evacuation with the only surface units which could survive in the area around Henderson Field: destroyers. Running down at night to drop supplies and evacuate Japanese infantry units, the famed Tokyo Express made frequent runs into the area. On the night of November 30, Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka led a force of eight Japanese destroyers down the slot. Of the eight, six were heavily loaded with supply drums and had landed their torpedo reloads, drastically reducing their combat effectiveness. Only Naganami (Tanaka's flagship) and Takanamii were fully combat ready. Waiting in Ironbottom Sound was a dramatically superior US force of 4 heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, and six destroyers. Unfortunately for the Americans this night, Tanaka's lookouts were very alert, and managed to detect the ambush before it happened. Once again, the linear battle tactics of the Americans cost them, as the Japanese destroyers wheeled, fired torpedoes, and 'ran for the exits'. The Americans got in enough gunfire to scupper Takanami (which had moved to screen her sisters from the Americans). And then the Long Lances hit. The end result was one US heavy cruiser sunk, and three more incapacitated. Not only that, but Tanaka had managed to drop off his supply barrels. It was a humiliating defeat for the US Navy, and a difficult one to swallow in light of their material superiority and the recent victory off of Guadalcanal. Both sides aimed for major offensives in January; each devoted the days of December to a sequence of preparatory steps. The Japanese mounted interlocking efforts to sustain the forces already on Guadalcanal and to accumulate and position air units. The Americans paced resupply with the replacement of worn 1st Marine Division fresh Marine and Army units while simultaneously air and light naval units maintained a counter campaign against Japanese logistical and airfield construction exertions. The American command also inaugurated an effort to annex Mount Austin that provoked some of the most vicious fighting in the campaign. These activities in the Solomons occupied the foreground during December, but in the background a debate rocked the senior Japanese governmental and service councils in Tokyo that lead to a fateful swing in Japanese strategy. On December 8th, transports removed the last of the American Division’s three regiments. The next day Vandegrift formally, but without fanfare, turned over command of the American forces on Guadalcanal to Major General Alexander M. Patch of the U.S. Army. Vandegrift chose to mark this occasion not with a florid speech or general order dwelling on the accomplishments of his division, but with a concise letter that paid generous tribute to the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who had, worked, fought, and died side by side with his marines. Nor did he forget the coast watchers. As these small ceremonies took place, the first echelon of the division began embarkation. They were dressed in green dungarees or dirty khaki, often with limbs protruding from shirts chopped back to the shoulders, trousers clipped at the knees, or sleeves and pants legs that ended in fringes of tatters. Knotted laces or pieces of string secured their field boots. A few men sported Japanese footgear. Upon arriving in their boats alongside the ships that were to take them away, the marines were asked to leave as they came, traversing dangling cargo nets. This was far too taxing for some, who had to be hoisted up by the strong arms of healthy sailors. Many of the Marines made their last act on Guadalcanal a visit to the cemetery that contained most of the division’s 650 dead. Thirty-one Marines would be permanently listed as missing. Another 1,278 marines won Purple Heart Medals for wounds, but around 8,580 wore no decorations for their diseases, principally malaria. About forty-eight hours before their departure, medical officers scrutinized one unidentified regiment and found fully one-third of its members unfit for further combat. On December 23, two dozen Zeros of the 252nd Air Group fluttered down to Munda with nine other Zeros in escort. The 252nd Air Group lost two planes in a clash over its new base that also cost two wildcats and a P-39. The following morning, nine SBDs, nine P-39s, four P-38s, and four F4Fs from the Cactus Air Force found four zeros airborne and the others being readied. The American fighters claimed fourteen Zeros in the air and, the dive-bombers reported mangling the remainder on the ground. This incident was basically the way the entire Japanese supply effort at this time was going. The impact of the inability of the Imperial Navy to deliver provisions to the 17th Army was calamitous. Rations in the 38th Division fell to one-sixth for the men in the front line and one-tenth for the others, but even by this regimen the unit consumed all the food landed in December by the 17th. The Japanese were maintaining their garrison on Guadalcanal merely to occupy the Americans while they constructed a pair of airfields in the Central Solomons. Keeping the garrison alive, however, became increasingly difficult as the destroyers came under increasing attacks by planes during the day and PT boats during the night. Tokyo at last concluded that Guadalcanal would have to be abandoned. Getting the Japanese soldiers of the island posed a serious problem. Solving it took weeks of planning and preparation, and movements of the Combined Fleet to divert American attention. When the Americans on Guadalcanal, reinforced to 50,000 soldiers marines, closed the pincers on the Japanese positions in early February 1943, they found that there prey had slipped through there fingers. A score of destroyers in three high-speed night runs down the slot had carried away the 7000 half-starved survivors of the enemy garrison. After almost exactly six months of struggle, sweat, and blood, the 2,500 square miles of fevered jungle and sun baked plain called Guadalcanal was in American hands. As both sides recognized, this achievement far exceeded the value of undisputed possession of one Pacific Island. With the fall of Guadalcanal, Japan was presented with a stunning setback. For the first time in the war, the Imperial military had been defeated decisively on the ground, in the air, and on the sea. Now it would have to shift its stance from the offense to the defense, as the ever-strengthening allied forces began pushing their way up the Slot towards Rabaul. For the Americans, difficult fighting still lay ahead, and they would suffer several more tactical defeats at the hands of the Japanese Navy as the battles in the Solomons continued. Yet with the victory at Guadalcanal, both combatants recognized that the momentum of the pacific war had shifted decisively in the Allies favor. Bibliography: Word Count: 6007
Copyright © 2005 College Term Papers, INC All Rights Reserved.