e applied to the usage of the second bomb, "fat man," which was dropped on Nagasaki three days later. One could wonder if the motive behind this second attack was similar to the first; the only difference being that the bomb to be "tested" this time was considerably more powerful.The final say on whether or not to drop the bomb came from President Harry Truman, who had help from a special committee known as the Interim Committee. This organization was made up of Secretary Stimson as chairman; President Truman's personal representative, James F. Byrnes; the Under Secretary of the Navy, William L. Clayton; and the Assistant Secretary of State as well as many others. The work of the Interim Committee was to discuss the uses of the bomb and whether or not it would be wise to use nuclear force against Japan in combat. On July 1, 1945, the committee submitted a report to President Truman stating that:1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings.3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon.The Interim Committee decided against warning the Japanese about the atomic bomb because they claimed that they weren't sure if it would detonate. "Not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary thought well of a bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one could be certain, in spite of the assurances of the scientists, that the 'thing would go off.'"2 This was refuted by many as being quite ignorant. For example, the atomic bomb was tested in Trinity Site, New Mexico, USA. It was viewed by the media, U.S. government officials and the military. Viewing the destruction firsthand should have convinced the United States that nuclear power was a real and tangible danger. They should have been quite sure at this point that the bomb would, indeed, detonate.The US wanted a quick and effective way to end the war. However, there were m...
