ster to Mexico, Nicholas P. Trist took it upon himself to work out the final conditions of the treaty. This action was in direct opposition to several dispatches from President Polk renouncing Trist's rights to negotiate for the US. Polk recalls in his diary, "He [Trist] has departed from his instructions so far as to invite proposals from the Mexican commissioners to be submitted to his government for its decision upon them, which can never be accepted by the United States." However, as the negotiations continued, Trist was able to obtain an offer of more favorable terms for the US. Trist sent word of his new arrangement to Washington and Polk reviewed the document with his cabinet. Upon pondering Trist's new proposal, Polk realized that his main war objectives (Acquisition of California and New Mexico, and the Rio Grande border for Texas) had been successfully obtained under the latest agreement. For this reason, and despite strong reservations by Buchanan, Polk accepted the treaty with minor revisions and sent it to Congress. Among the other reasons for his support of the treaty, Polk stressed that more negotiation was impossible, that Congress would probably discontinue monetary support for the war if he rejected the treaty, and "the immense value of California" was too important to take risks. The foreign policy of the peace effort is best described again as the result of judgments made by key individual decision makers. Although it was necessary for Congress to pass the treaty, Both Trist's and Polk's actions governed the outcome of the war. If Trist had not defied the government and acted solely on his faith in attaining a mutual peace, the war may have dragged on and the US may have been more harsh with the peace terms upon conclusion of the war. With the "All-of-Mexico" ideal gaining support, it is difficult to discredit the possibility (good or bad) of the complete dissolution of Mexico. Polk, like Trist, held great influence ...
