| |
 |
Modern Japan Yoshida Shigeru |
 |
|
Yoshida Shigeru was quite arguably the biggest key player in Japan’s postwar politics. Not only was he the prime minister, as well as the foreign minister for most of the first decade of Japan’s postwar period, but he also had a powerful group of political disciples known as the “Yoshida School”. It was this group of LDP conservatives who dominated the political arena during the majority of the postwar period, even after Yoshida’s fall from power in 1954.
Yoshida was one of the remaining conservatives who was not ousted from power by the Occupation. This is probably due to the fact that he very strongly opposed the militarists and their domination of the political system before, as well as during the war. Also, the military and the zaibatsu businessmen became the main victims of the purge; so many conservative pre-war bureaucrats were able to come back to power.
Yoshida’s main objectives for Japan were intense economic growth, pacifism, and for Japan to be rather passive and inactive in the international arena. These objectives are set forth in what can be referred to as Yoshida’s Doctrine, which basically states three different guidelines made by Yoshida for Japan to gain power and growth. They are the following:
1. Economic restoration of Japan is the number one goal; and this will be attained in part through cooperation with the U.S., both politically as well as economically.
2. Japan remains slightly armed and steps out of international conflicts.
3. Japan provides bases for U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force. (paraphrased from Pyle, p.235)
Yoshida was strongly opposed to any military re-armament, but in order to pacify Dulles and end the Occupation it was necessary to make minimal concessions. He had the support of General MacArthur in his position. In the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951, Yoshida agreed to: 1. Give military bases to U.S.; 2. U.S. had the right to not allow the military presence of any other country in Japan; 3. U.S. had the right to intervene in any domestic conflicts in Japan; 4. U.S. had the right to use military power from any of their bases in Japan without first gaining the consent of Japan; and 5. This treaty had an indefinite time period (Pyle, 235, 236).
Several of the subsequent Prime Ministers after Yoshida were of the “Yoshida School” and thus followed the guidelines of the Yoshida Doctrine in their efforts to improve Japan’s economy, as well as to prevent any re-armament on the part of Japan. Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku were two such prime ministers, in whom we can see the strength of Yoshida’s legacy.
It is obvious that the Yoshida priority of economic strength and rehabilitation was one of the guiding ideals for Ikeda. To say that Ikeda Hayato’s economic plan for Japan was successful would be a gross understatement. Ikeda came to power after Kishi was forced to resign in 1960. His “National Income Doubling Plan” was supposed to double the GNP within a ten-year period through a 7.2 percent growth rate. But in actuality, the growth rate climbed to almost 12 percent, thus far surpassing the hopes of Ikeda, and helping Japan to become an economic superpower.
In Sato’s term as Prime Minister we can see that the Yoshida ideal of pacifism was also a primary goal for Sato. During his term, Sato formulated 3 principles against nuclear weapon for Japan to uphold. These were that Japan would not possess, make, or allow nuclear weapons into the country. Also, Sato passed into law a ban on exporting weapons. He also started the practice of not allowing more than 1 percent of the GNP to be spent on maintaining a military.
To conclude, Yoshida was probably the most influential of all the key players in shaping postwar Japan. Yoshida’s Doctine introduced the principles that became the guidelines in strengthening Japan during the entire post-war era. Yoshida’s School dominated the conservative movement as well as the government; and it was the principles of Yoshida and the way they were upheld that led Japan to economic prosperity.
|
| |
|
| |
|
|
| |
|
|
| |
| |
 |
|
 |
| |
|
Related Essays |
|
 |
 |
|
 |
Continental Expansion of Japan
.... which inevitably followed can be found in part in the response of young samurai reformers, such as Yoshida Shoin, who .... Beasley, WG The Rise of Modern Japan. ....
(1546  6 pages  )
|
| | |
|
Western Influence on Japanese Traditions
.... given to the policies undertaken by Prime Minister Yoshida that "gave .... For example, Japan's modern industrial policy has been identified as neomercantilist, or ....
(3527 14 pages )
|
| | |
|
US Government & Japan's Motorola Corporation Dispute
.... Pyle, Kenneth B. The Making of Modern Japan, 2d ed. Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1996. .... Williams, Daniel. Japan: Beyond the End of History. .... Yoshida, Susumu. ....
(4567 18 pages )
|
| | |
|
Education Policy During the Allied Occupation of Japan
.... and the zaibatsu cabinets under Shidehara and Yoshida, as well .... was to happen to Post-World-War-II Japan. A modern banking system was created, and the monetary ....
(9993 40 pages )
|
| | |
|
The Democratization of Education
.... and the zaibatsu cabinets under Shidehara and Yoshida, as well .... was to happen to Post-World-War-II Japan. A modern banking system was created, and the monetary ....
(10002 40 pages )
|
| | |
|
Japanese and Iranian Culture
.... The development of the modern carpetmaking industry produced .... oceans of information relevant to Japan as a .... of an omniscient narrator, Mika Yoshida's fear that ....
(3542 14 pages )
|
| | |
|
|
 |
|
| |
| |
|
|
|
|
