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Party Sysytems in Latin America

Party Sysytems in Latin America This essay will compare and contrast the party systems of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay according to Mainwaring and Shugart's Chapter 11 of Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. First, I will discuss majority verses minority government; second, I will discuss the number of relevant parties; third, I will discuss the level of party discipline with the parties. In Presidential systems of government, the level of support for the president in congress, either through a majority or coalitions, influences the success of the regime to get things done. The amount of parties in a system indicates the likelihood the president will have a majority or be forced to focus on forming coalitions. The latter can cause a weakening of the regime. The level of party discipline is created by the party rules within each system and creates different incentives for politicians either toward the people or the regime. In Brazil it is unlikely the President will possess a majority in the congress because Brazil is composed of many parties. The President must collaborate with other parties that are near by on the ideology/policy spectrum in order to form a majority. In the 1994 election, the winning coalition was comprised of more than six parties. The most popular party was the PSDB (Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy), 54.3%; the PT (The Worker's Party), 27%; the PRONA, 7.4%; the PMDB (Party of Brazilian Democratic Movement), 4.4%; The PDT (Democratic Labor Party), 3.2%; the PPR (Reformist Progressive Party), 2.8%; and others, 1%. These parties are not ideological similar. The parties cooperated o win the election. Many of the parties will not be represented on the cabinet or support the president in congress. As a result, these elections do not indicate whether or not the president will be supported in congress. The President has strong proactive powers to counter this weakness. In Uruguay, the President has historically been supported by a substantial amount of congress rendering coalitions unnecessary. According to tale 11.1in Mainwaring and Shugart, the president in Uruguay has had an average of 45.6% of the seats in the Lower House and 43.8% of the seats in the upper house. This congressional composition is an ideal amount of support because it allows checks and balances to work; yet, the president can successfully implement a program. The last election in Uruguay did not yield this traditional composition. No party received a significant majority. The votes were split three ways between the Blanco, the Colorado, and the EP (Progressive Encounter). Whether or not this significant plurality trend will continue is unclear. The president of Argentina has usually enjoyed a significant amount of support in congress from his/her own party and coalitions. Mainwaring and Shugart's table11.1 shows Argentina President to have an average support of 48.3% in the Lower House and 52% in the upper house. Including coalition partners 49% in the Lower House and 52.0% in the upper house supports the president. This kind of congressional composition has the ability to inhibit checks and balance by a minority party. This is the extreme of winner take all politics, majority politics. In the last presidential election, the PJ (Personist Party) won 49.8% of the vote, not closely followed the FG (FREPASO) with 29.2%, followed by the UCR (Radical Civic Union). Since then, the PJ has lost a significant majority and only through a coalition between with other party can it hope to achieve a congressional majority. Mainwaring and Shugart argue those institutional arrangements like timing and type of election has an impact on the number of parties, as well as, the district magnitude. Countries with high district magnitude are likely to have more parties. Holding congressional elections non-concurrently and electing presidents by majority run-off, individually, contribute to fractionalization. Holding and congressional elections concurrently and electing presidents by plurality contribute create less parties. In Brazil, after 1994, there have been many effective parties. Mainwaring an Shugart's Table 11.2 in Chapter 11 shows Brazil to have an average of 6.08 effective parties in the lower house and 9.5 effective parties in the upper house. Brazil has congressional elections concurrently and uses the majority runoff for presidential elections. In comparison, Brazil's 1954-1990 non-concurrent congressional elections, the average of effective parties varied from 3.9 to 5.7. This indicates other factors are influencing the outcome, like proportional representation. From 1945-1950, Brazil held congressional and presidential elections concurrently and elected the president by a plurality. Holding to Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis, Brazil had only 2.71 effective parties. Uruguay has a low level of effect parties. Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis is partly incorrect about Uruguay in respect to the district magnitude. Brazil's district magnitude ranges from 1 to 9.3. Uruguay's district magnitude is 99-almost the whole country. According to Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis, countries with a high district magnitude should have a high number of effective parties because they are likely to use proportional representation. Uruguay has only 2.6 effective parties. This is explained by the electoral cycle with is concurrent for congress and elects the president by plurality. Other factors, like party discipline explained later, play role. Argentina, like Uruguay, has a low number of effective parties. According o Mainwaring and Shugart's Chapter 11 table 11.2 the average number of effective parties in the Lower House is 2.62. The average in the upper house is not available. Argentina has recently changed the nature of the electoral system. The congress is elected nonconcurrently and the president is elected by majority run-off. This change may cause a fractionalization of the parties. Early signs of fractionalization are evident in the current election. A group of three parties: the UCR, the FREPASO, the FPS, are forming and alliance against the traditionally dominate PJ. The coalition may not last beyond he election. Party discipline is defined by Mainwaring and Shugart as "the extent to which presidents can rely on party leaders to deliver the vote of their party or, conversely, the extent to which presidents need to secure the support of individual legislators or party factions"(p. 418). Presidential systems are known for not being very disciplined. A lack of discipline allows legislator to make decisions based on their gut beliefs and in the interests of the people they represent, not a party. On the other hand, a completely undisciplined congress makes forming stable relationships between groups within government difficult which can ultimately force the president to use unorthodox means of gaining support. Therefore, the ideal level of discipline is somewhere in-between these two extremes. Mainwaring and Shugart propose three elements sum up the level of party discipline within a country. First, does the party control the selection of candidates, open list? Second, does the party control the order of the candidates in elections, closed list? Third, does the party pool votes among candidates or lists within districts? Table 11.5 in Chapter 11 maps out countries in relation to these elements. Brazil is the least disciplined of the three countries. Brazil uses a "birthright candidate" open list system. The purpose of the "birthright candidate" rule is to give politicians more freedom of choice. The rule states deputies cannot be denied future nomination by the party despite their level of submission to party lines. Mainwaring and Shugart's table 11.3 shows parties in Brazil do not have control over the selection of candidates or the order of candidates. Parties do pool votes among lists. As a result, politicians have a great degree of autonomy and an incentive to cater to the people, not the party. This may be an advantage to the party because the party can benefit from a highly popular candidate when votes are pooled. On the other hand, party labels may become blurred as candidates progress through their political career and waver from their initial ideology. Fractionalization is another repercussion of this policy, which can make things difficult for the president. Uruguay is more disciplined than Brazil, but less disciplined than Argentina. Brazil elects congress by factional lists. The different parties put out a bunch of different list and constituents vote for their favorite list. Mainwaring and Shugart's Table 11.3, first, indicates the parties have control over candidate selection. As a result, candidates and legislators must be loyal to the party to certain degree in order to get on the again. Second, the parties do not have control over the order of election. This means the candidates must, also, cater to the people whom ultimately decide the winner. Third, the votes are pooled. This allows the party to benefit form any remarkably popular candidate. Overall, the Uruguayan party system is very balanced forcing politicians to weight to juggle the needs of the party and the constituents. The Argentine system is the most disciplined of the party systems. All three of Mainwaring and Shugart's three elements are present. First, Argentine parties have the ability to control candidate selection. As a result, candidates must adhere strictly to party rules and politics if they wish to be placed on the list. This means candidates will think less about the constituents they represent and more about the needs and wants of the party. Second, the party controls the order of candidates' names as they appear on the list. This creates an atmosphere of competition within the party. Candidates are forced to play party politics while trying to shoulder out competitors. Seems rather two faced. Voters lose, as they cannot directly choose a presidential candidate, but only a party. Third, the party pools the votes among lists with districts. Parties that use closed lists automatically have this element too. This essay has focused on showing the differences between party politics in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. This group is representative of the entire spectrum of possibilities. Brazil tended to have minority governments in congress, a large number of effective parties, and low level of discipline. Uruguay tended to have minority governments with a significant plurality, few effective parties and moderately disciplined parties. Argentina tended to regularly employ minority governments without a significant majority has a low number of effective parties, although this is changing, and has a high degree of party discipline. Each of these countries has created these systems in order to ensure the government is as effective as possible, thereby, creating the best possible environment for the people. This essay will compare and contrast the party systems of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay according to Mainwaring and Shugart's Chapter 11 of Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. First, I will discuss majority verses minority government; second, I will discuss the number of relevant parties; third, I will discuss the level of party discipline with the parties. In Presidential systems of government, the level of support for the president in congress, either through a majority or coalitions, influences the success of the regime to get things done. The amount of parties in a system indicates the likelihood the president will have a majority or be forced to focus on forming coalitions. The latter can cause a weakening of the regime. The level of party discipline is created by the party rules within each system and creates different incentives for politicians either toward the people or the regime. In Brazil it is unlikely the President will possess a majority in the congress because Brazil is composed of many parties. The President must collaborate with other parties that are near by on the ideology/policy spectrum in order to form a majority. In the 1994 election, the winning coalition was comprised of more than six parties. The most popular party was the PSDB (Party of the Brazilian Social Democracy), 54.3%; the PT (The Worker's Party), 27%; the PRONA, 7.4%; the PMDB (Party of Brazilian Democratic Movement), 4.4%; The PDT (Democratic Labor Party), 3.2%; the PPR (Reformist Progressive Party), 2.8%; and others, 1%. These parties are not ideological similar. The parties cooperated o win the election. Many of the parties will not be represented on the cabinet or support the president in congress. As a result, these elections do not indicate whether or not the president will be supported in congress. The President has strong proactive powers to counter this weakness. In Uruguay, the President has historically been supported by a substantial amount of congress rendering coalitions unnecessary. According to tale 11.1in Mainwaring and Shugart, the president in Uruguay has had an average of 45.6% of the seats in the Lower House and 43.8% of the seats in the upper house. This congressional composition is an ideal amount of support because it allows checks and balances to work; yet, the president can successfully implement a program. The last election in Uruguay did not yield this traditional composition. No party received a significant majority. The votes were split three ways between the Blanco, the Colorado, and the EP (Progressive Encounter). Whether or not this significant plurality trend will continue is unclear. The president of Argentina has usually enjoyed a significant amount of support in congress from his/her own party and coalitions. Mainwaring and Shugart's table11.1 shows Argentina President to have an average support of 48.3% in the Lower House and 52% in the upper house. Including coalition partners 49% in the Lower House and 52.0% in the upper house supports the president. This kind of congressional composition has the ability to inhibit checks and balance by a minority party. This is the extreme of winner take all politics, majority politics. In the last presidential election, the PJ (Personist Party) won 49.8% of the vote, not closely followed the FG (FREPASO) with 29.2%, followed by the UCR (Radical Civic Union). Since then, the PJ has lost a significant majority and only through a coalition between with other party can it hope to achieve a congressional majority. Mainwaring and Shugart argue those institutional arrangements like timing and type of election has an impact on the number of parties, as well as, the district magnitude. Countries with high district magnitude are likely to have more parties. Holding congressional elections non-concurrently and electing presidents by majority run-off, individually, contribute to fractionalization. Holding and congressional elections concurrently and electing presidents by plurality contribute create less parties. In Brazil, after 1994, there have been many effective parties. Mainwaring an Shugart's Table 11.2 in Chapter 11 shows Brazil to have an average of 6.08 effective parties in the lower house and 9.5 effective parties in the upper house. Brazil has congressional elections concurrently and uses the majority runoff for presidential elections. In comparison, Brazil's 1954-1990 non-concurrent congressional elections, the average of effective parties varied from 3.9 to 5.7. This indicates other factors are influencing the outcome, like proportional representation. From 1945-1950, Brazil held congressional and presidential elections concurrently and elected the president by a plurality. Holding to Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis, Brazil had only 2.71 effective parties. Uruguay has a low level of effect parties. Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis is partly incorrect about Uruguay in respect to the district magnitude. Brazil's district magnitude ranges from 1 to 9.3. Uruguay's district magnitude is 99-almost the whole country. According to Mainwaring and Shugart's hypothesis, countries with a high district magnitude should have a high number of effective parties because they are likely to use proportional representation. Uruguay has only 2.6 effective parties. This is explained by the electoral cycle with is concurrent for congress and elects the president by plurality. Other factors, like party discipline explained later, play role. Argentina, like Uruguay, has a low number of effective parties. According o Mainwaring and Shugart's Chapter 11 table 11.2 the average number of effective parties in the Lower House is 2.62. The average in the upper house is not available. Argentina has recently changed the nature of the electoral system. The congress is elected nonconcurrently and the president is elected by majority run-off. This change may cause a fractionalization of the parties. Early signs of fractionalization are evident in the current election. A group of three parties: the UCR, the FREPASO, the FPS, are forming and alliance against the traditionally dominate PJ. The coalition may not last beyond he election. Party discipline is defined by Mainwaring and Shugart as "the extent to which presidents can rely on party leaders to deliver the vote of their party or, conversely, the extent to which presidents need to secure the support of individual legislators or party factions"(p. 418). Presidential systems are known for not being very disciplined. A lack of discipline allows legislator to make decisions based on their gut beliefs and in the interests of the people they represent, not a party. On the other hand, a completely undisciplined congress makes forming stable relationships between groups within government difficult which can ultimately force the president to use unorthodox means of gaining support. Therefore, the ideal level of discipline is somewhere in-between these two extremes. Mainwaring and Shugart propose three elements sum up the level of party discipline within a country. First, does the party control the selection of candidates, open list? Second, does the party control the order of the candidates in elections, closed list? Third, does the party pool votes among candidates or lists within districts? Table 11.5 in Chapter 11 maps out countries in relation to these elements. Brazil is the least disciplined of the three countries. Brazil uses a "birthright candidate" open list system. The purpose of the "birthright candidate" rule is to give politicians more freedom of choice. The rule states deputies cannot be denied future nomination by the party despite their level of submission to party lines. Mainwaring and Shugart's table 11.3 shows parties in Brazil do not have control over the selection of candidates or the order of candidates. Parties do pool votes among lists. As a result, politicians have a great degree of autonomy and an incentive to cater to the people, not the party. This may be an advantage to the party because the party can benefit from a highly popular candidate when votes are pooled. On the other hand, party labels may become blurred as candidates progress through their political career and waver from their initial ideology. Fractionalization is another repercussion of this policy, which can make things difficult for the president. Uruguay is more disciplined than Brazil, but less disciplined than Argentina. Brazil elects congress by factional lists. The different parties put out a bunch of different list and constituents vote for their favorite list. Mainwaring and Shugart's Table 11.3, first, indicates the parties have control over candidate selection. As a result, candidates and legislators must be loyal to the party to certain degree in order to get on the again. Second, the parties do not have control over the order of election. This means the candidates must, also, cater to the people whom ultimately decide the winner. Third, the votes are pooled. This allows the party to benefit form any remarkably popular candidate. Overall, the Uruguayan party system is very balanced forcing politicians to weight to juggle the needs of the party and the constituents. The Argentine system is the most disciplined of the party systems. All three of Mainwaring and Shugart's three elements are present. First, Argentine parties have the ability to control candidate selection. As a result, candidates must adhere strictly to party rules and politics if they wish to be placed on the list. This means candidates will think less about the constituents they represent and more about the needs and wants of the party. Second, the party controls the order of candidates' names as they appear on the list. This creates an atmosphere of competition within the party. Candidates are forced to play party politics while trying to shoulder out competitors. Seems rather two faced. Voters lose, as they cannot directly choose a presidential candidate, but only a party. Third, the party pools the votes among lists with districts. Parties that use closed lists automatically have this element too. This essay has focused on showing the differences between party politics in Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina. This group is representative of the entire spectrum of possibilities. Brazil tended to have minority governments in congress, a large number of effective parties, and low level of discipline. Uruguay tended to have minority governments with a significant plurality, few effective parties and moderately disciplined parties. Argentina tended to regularly employ minority governments without a significant majority has a low number of effective parties, although this is changing, and has a high degree of party discipline. Each of these countries has created these systems in order to ensure the government is as effective as possible, thereby, creating the best possible environment for the people. Bibliography:

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