ic at consular and ambassadorial levels alike, with little delay and almost as if it were an open book. The US code word for the resulting intelligence was “Magic.” The Americans had also made great progress in penetrating Japan’s military codes and ciphers by 1941 (code word “Ultra,” also used by the British for military signals intelligence, which they exchanged with the Americans.) Sometimes information from one source filled out, clarified, or confirmed interceptions from another. It is hardly surprising that for some people the question has become, not “Did we know?” but “How could we not have known?” But is that fair?” (Van der Vat 94) “Since the early 1920’s America had been eavesdropping on Japanese government communications. Roosevelt’s military leaders called it a “spledid arrangement”” (Stinnett 60) Now if that is true and the United States knew all about what the Japanese were doing then why wouldn’t they have known about the attack on Pearl Harbor? And not only that, but why would the President of the United States not want to warn his own country of an attack that would harm his nation and kill thousands? Even though Roosevelt tried to deny it, the radio taps America had on Japan were flawless. “Altogether it was an exceptional effort of extraordinary scope of achievement, and for years it had kept American officials aware of every intention and activity of the Japanese government.” (Stinnett 60) Roosevelt is not the only one to blame, even though he was the President, and knew about the attack, and did not fulfill his duties at President to protect the country. “The army was responsible for the inshore air patrol and the installation of a radar net, and the Navy for inshore ship patrols and distant reconnaissance.” (Wohlstetter 5) “On December 7 the Army Aircraft Warning Service (AWS) c...
