the Athenian populace into the walled city created a great risk of infectious disease. Indeed, a terrible plague wrought havoc on the besieged city from 430-429 and again in 427. Pericles himself fell to the plague in 429. The extent to which this amounts to "Monday morning quarterbacking" is uncertain; but at the bare minimum, Pericles seems to have underestimated the extent of the hardships his strategy would bring on the people.The author and historian Donald Kagan expanded on this point. First, he noted that the plan lacked credibility. Pericles asked Athenians to passively hide behind the walls and watch the Spartan Army level their farms and homes. He asked them to "tolerate the insults and accusations of cowardice the enemy would hurl at them from beneath their walls." Secondly, in a related theory, Kagan noted that this strategy flew in the face of Greek habit and culture. Indeed, Athens abandoned this strategy after Pericles died in 429. This is not to say that the plan was unsuccessful to that point - but it was "un-Athenian" to just do nothing and wait. Alternative AnalysisAthenian tactics in the years following Pericles' death resulted in the near-total loss of the fleet and eventual victory for Sparta. These facts certainly lend credibility to Pericles' defense-based strategic principles, which were by no means foolhardy. He correctly observed that "a power dominant by sea can do certain things which a land power is debarred from doing; as, for instance, ravage the territory of a superior, since it is always possible to coast along to some point, where either there is no hostile force to deal with or merely a small body." In addition, Pericles knew the Spartan culture. He knew that it was a tumultuous city-state where the risk of rebellion by the slave population was always a real threat. When a great armed force marched out of the city, the risk of rebellion grew exponentially. If enough Spartan forces were ...
