s. As Steven Fish writes: “All had advocated ‘transition to a market economy.’ But this goal had been more of a dream than a demand, and few had actually considered how to achieve it (Fish 215). With all due deference to clich, the early Russian economic policies can be succinctly summarized in “Be careful what you wish for; you might just get it.” Khrushchev stated that a country may follow its own road to socialism, and in a perverse sense that logic is still be applicable for Russian affairs. But, rather the mandate should be that each country should follow its own road towards capitalism. An examination of what the Communist apparatus left in its wake should cause pause for any free-market optimist. Seventy plus years of state socialism has left Russia with a two-ton gorilla on its collective economic back. On page 66 and 67 of his “Dangers And Dilemmas of Democracy”, Smitter outlines possible starting scenarios for incipient democracies. A best case scenario finds the nation with a preceding autocracy that had already concentrated profits, encouraged the private accumulation of wealth, increased the state’s fiscal capacity, invested in the country’s physical infrastructure and provided a positive starting point for international trade. Countries, such as Chile and Spain, that had inherited these elements, found the transition to a market economy easier. Russia and the other successor states to the Soviet Union found themselves in a much more precarious predicament. The state socialist regime left a legacy of corruption, protectionism, price distortions, foreign indebtedness, inefficient public enterprises, trade imbalances, and fiscal instability (Smitter 67). Combined with the simultaneous need for political reform, Russia faces a tall task indeed. The dubious tradition of the Soviet era has led to an overdependence on foreign advise and models of capitalism. Yet, it is clear t...
