d technical resources. The Soviets felt that theChinese were far too hasty and the full “communization” of a nation took a long time. Butwhat the Soviets were even more afraid of was that the Great Leap Forward would be agreat success and that the Chinese would overtake the Soviets. (Griffith, 98-101) TheSoviets’ lack of support in the Great Leap Forward left the Chinese disappointed andangry. They felt that they had been very loyal to the Soviets, espicially in the Korean War,and they Soviets had reapyed their kindness by supporting the Americans and scoffing thatChinese ambitions.A further straining of relations came in 1959 when the Chinese outlined theirfuture objectives. The Chinese had laid claim to the Nationalist island of Formosa, theywanted to conquer Tibet and adjust the Sino-Indian border their favor. The USSR alsohad a few objectives in mind- they wanted to equal the United States as a world powerand avoid a possible conflict with the Americans. The Soviets visited China and asked theChinese to accept the “Two Chinas” formula, which basically said that the Chinesecommunists should not try to conquer the lands of the American-supported Nationalists,even though the Nationalists were very weak. Khrushchev also wanted to court India asan ally, and when the Chinese tried to gain land along the Sino-Indian border, Khrushchevchose to desert China and declare neutrality on the issue. (Simmons 62-7) The Chinesewere outraged. They felt that the Soviets, the so-called leaders of the communistmovement, had betrayed them again. The Soviets had supported democratic coutriestwice- once in the bombarment of Quemoy and now in Sino-Indian border disputes.Tensions became even more heated in late 1959 when the USSR suddenly refusedto give the Chinese data for the construction of an atomic bomb, which was promised in1957. Then, in the summer of 1960, some three thousand Soviet specialists left China anddestroyed al...
