or world hegemony, but they meant only the German effort to dominate the world's markets. The British also talked of the menace of the German fleet, but in reality it was never large enough to threaten seriously Britain's control of the seas. And the Germans, on their side, talked of the insult to German national honor whenever the British excluded them from Morocco, or Persia or some other profitable market. Finally, we come to the Franco-German antagonism. This is older than any of the others and an understanding of it is made difficult by the enormous literature that befogs the subject. Yet it is clear that France, like Great Britain, was controlled by her bankers and manufacturers. These classes found it easier to dominate the deputies in a democratic republic than the king in a monarchy. But the republicans had got off to a bad start in 1870-71 when they lost the war; to them Alsace-Lorraine was the symbol af their defeat. Until they seem to realize that foreign offices are subject to the same influences. In this country our State Department lately indulged in a classic example of servility to a dbminant group. It found out that several South American countries were in such a precarious position that investments there were unsafe. It sent the news to Wall Street and asked it not to lend any money to these states. When Wall Street, despite this warning, continued to float more bonds which the State Department knew were likely to injure our investors it should have informed the investing public of the facts. But instead, it kept quiet and let American investors lose their money. But tbough it is an indisputable fact that governments always act, whether in peace or in war, in accordance with thc intercsts of the dominant economic and socia1 groups, this does not mean that they can afford to neglect the pretense of protecting the interests of other groups. Louis Philippe lost his throne because he made no effort to persuade the classes...
