and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime located outside of Cuba; 2) the development of a means for mass communication to the Cuban people as part of a powerful propaganda offensive; 3) the creation and development of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which would respond to the orders and directions of the exile opposition; and 4) the development of a paramilitary force outside of Cuba for future guerrilla action. A few months later, in July of 1960, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, spoke of arming Cuba with rockets that would protect it from the U.S. In response, President Eisenhower announced that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of a regime dominated by international communism in the western hemisphere. Richard Bissell, an aide to CIA director Allen Dulles, described a meeting that took place in the White House on January 3, 1961, stating, President [Eisenhower] seemed to be eager to take forceful action against Castro, and breaking off diplomatic relations appeared to be his best card. He noted that he was prepared to move against Castro before Kennedys inauguration on the twentieth if a really good excuse was provided by Castro. Failing that, he said, perhaps we could think of manufacturing something that would be generally acceptable. This is but another example of his willingness to use covert actionspecifically to fabricate eventsto achieve his objectives in foreign policy. The CIA began training a force of Cuban exiles that would ultimately man the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Cuba, and quickly established anti-Castro radio broadcasting. By the time Kennedy took office in January of 1961, the training and planning for the exile invasion were nearing completion. The CIA had organized a brigade of about 1,400 exile fighters at a secluded camp in Guatemala, and was infiltrating advance teams of organizers and saboteurs into Cuba. Kennedy had...
