. The general consensus by many leaders was that Moscow was pulling the strings so we could not let them get away with anything and we could use any force for the preventive action. Any force also constituted nuclear military engagement in the minds of many public servants. As Truman announced to America that the Russians also had the bomb many realized how catastrophic a full-blown war with the communists could be. Whitfield writes about how the threat of complete annihilation didnt scare everyone within the military power system, and how some like the chairman of the congressional committee on Atomic energy felt that the only way to save ourselves was through a preempted attack with full force upon the communists and completely obliterate them. Many agreed with thoughts like this and other such outrageous plans with no concern for the consequences like using total nuclear force on the Korean communists during the war because it would be cheaper. Probably the closest we ever got to dropping the bomb, according to Whitfield, was in a little Asiatic territory known as Vietnam. Some key military personnel like Nixon and John foster Dulles tried to convince Ike that we needed to drop the bomb to help the French. Eisenhower of course refused, but Whitfield feels that if Congress and the Western allies fighting had agreed then Ike would have went along with the proposal. All of this nuclear foreboding stemmed from the Republican doctrine introduced during the cold war that we would engage any Marxian movement with massive retaliation. Many felt that this idea of striking terror into the enemy would work to avoid real conflict. This doctrine though quickly clashed with sanity. Most of Washington soon realized the magnanimity of our proposition and it was never thankfully instituted. John Foster Dulles the secretary of state had been the main proponent behind this idea and Whitfield feels that he scared America with his ideas more then he did ...
