nefits, but argues that this alone does not warrant a constitutional requirement that television cameras be allowed at criminal trials. The Government points out that in Estes v Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), many potential pitfalls of televised proceedings are listed, including: (1) the possibility that televising the proceedings will have a direct bearing on (a jurors) vote as to guilt or innocence, (2) the possibility that jurors will be preoccupied with the telecasting rather than with the testimony, (3) the possibility that jurors will be influenced by television broadcasts of the proceedings or subjected to commentary or criticism from members of the public, (4) the difficulty of obtaining an unbiased venire if a retrial is required in a case where the first trial was televised. Court-TVs brief requests allowance for cameras in the courtroom. It opens with the statement that all while fifty states permit some type of television coverage, and thirty-seven states allow cameras in criminal proceedings, the federal courts do not allow cameras in the courtroom. The defendant claims that this ban is unconstitutional. They go on to argue that there is no principled constitutional distinction between the right to observe legal proceedings first-hand and the right to record and telecast those proceedings for the benefit of persons who, for any of a variety of reasons, cannot attend the proceedings at the courthouse. , and thus the First Amendment protects this right to record. However, Court-TV then agrees that the First Amendment right of access is in no way absolute, and therefore they do not wish to see a ruling in which cameras should be permitted into all criminal trials. Permittance of cameras into courtrooms should be allowed on a trial-to-trial basis. The defense admits that there are many cases weighing against its position, but states that much has changed in the years since Estes v. Texas, and uses Justice Harlans concurrence f...