could reasonably conclude thatmost of the factors weigh in a plaintiff's favor. Abdul-Jabbar,85 F.3d at 413 (9th Cir. 1996). See also MDT Corporation v.New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1028, 1032(C.D. Cal. 1994) (summary judgment disfavored in trademarkcases because the ultimate issue of likelihood of confusion isso inherently factual).[12] Application of these factors indicates that the districtcourt erred in rejecting appellants' Lanham Act claim at thesummary judgment stage because a jury could reasonablyconclude that most of the factors weigh in appellants' favor.Wendt and Ratzenberger were principal players on Cheers, apopular television show. They are clearly well-known amongthe target customers of Host's Cheers bars. For the purposesof this analysis, a jury could reasonably conclude that theirmark is strong.[13] For the same reason, their `goods' (their skill and fameas actors) are obviously related to Host's `goods' (the prod-ucts sold in the Cheers bars and the bars themselves) even ifthey are not strictly competitive. The issue is whether a con-sumer would be confused as to Wendt and Ratzenberger'sassociation with or sponsorship of Host's bars. See White, 971F.2d at 1400 ("In cases concerning confusion over celebrityendorsement, the plaintiff's `goods' concern the reasons for orsource of the plaintiff's fame.") The source of their fame andthe Host bars are identical: the Cheers television series. A jurycould conclude that this factor weighs in appellants' favorbecause it would be reasonable for a customer to be confusedas to the nature of Wendt and Ratzenberger's association withHost's Cheers bars and the goods sold there. 12363[14] The third factor, the similarity of the marks, is the pri-mary issue in dispute. Because appellants have raised triableissues of material fact concerning the degree to which therobots resemble the appellants, a reasonable jury might findthat this factor wei...
