n ab-sent preemptive legislation.A copyright licensee must be able to exercise rights whichare inherently federal in nature without worrying that 50 sepa-rate states will burden those rights. This is most obviouslytrue when state law restricts the display of derivative worksoutside the borders of its state. Compare Goldstein, 412 U.S.at 558. Yet that is exactly what the panel approves here:_________________________________________________________________7 The Seventh Circuit is not alone in recognizing the need to limit theright of publicity. See, e.g., Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d1443, 1447-49 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing first sale doctrine as limitingright of publicity). Scholars, too, have soundly rejected White. See ArlenW. Langvardt, The Troubling Implications of a Right of Publicity "Wheel"Spun Out of Control, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 329 (1997); Stephen R. Barnett,First Amendment Limits on the Right of Publicity, 30 Tort & Ins. L.J. 635(1995); Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The Overextension of CelebrityPublicity Rights in State and Federal Courts, 79 Minn. L. Rev. 485(1994); Jeff Sanders, By Force of Persona: How the Right of PublicityUndermines the First Amendment, 28 Beverly Hills B. Ass'n J. 13 (1994).Even our treatment of Wendt and Ratzenberger's claim has already beencriticized. See Felix H. Kent, Right of Privacy and of Publicity, N.Y.L.J.,Dec. 19, 1997, at 3; Recent Case, 17 No. 4 Ent. L. Rep. 17 (1995). 14908Plaintiffs are using California law to stop Host from display-ing a copyrighted work in Kansas City and Cleveland. WhyCalifornia should set the national standard for what is a per-missible use of a licensed derivative work is beyond me.Rather than construe the right of publicity narrowly to avoidthis constitutional conundrum, see Crowell v. Benson, 285U.S. 22, 62 (1932), the panel compounds White 's errors byenforcing California's right of publicity way beyond Califor-nia's bord...
