ormal police tactics. Had that ruling been upheld, police officer's use of voluntary statements would have been hindered, as police would have hesitated to solicit or receive any suspect's voluntary statements at risk of tainting later confessions. By inhibiting police procedure the efficiency of police would be impeded.DUE PROCESSThis Supreme Court decision strikes a critical blow to due process and the rights of the accused. There was no argument as to the fact that Officers Burke and McAllister were remiss in their failure to advise the accused of his rights. But by simply disallowing the initial unadvised statement and not the ensuing confession, the Court is ignoring the coercive circumstances under which that formal statement was made. Elstad maintained that he believed his first admission could be used against him, and it was due to that belief that he gave his full confession. Unaware of his own precarious legal circumstances, having neither been shown the arrest warrant or advised of his rights, Elstad made an admission which he might not have made had he been advised of his rights. Under the coercive belief that his first statement would be used against him, Elstad made a full confession, a confession that was most certainly the fruit of the poisoned tree. By denying the coercive impact of the first statement, the Supreme Court has denied much of the Wong Sun "fruit" doctrine. In Wong Sun v. United States (371 U.S. 471,) the Supreme Court holds that a suspect's voluntary statement, made in a situation of extreme tension, cannot be considered voluntary; "Under such circumstances it is unreasonable to infer that [suspect's] response was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of unlawful invasion." Thus, under circumstances of duress, according to Supreme Court precedent, a statement can be considered involuntary even when the coercion is not immediately obvious. Under the conviction that one has a...
