ntage in crisis, since the Communists command a more flexible set of tools for imposing strain on the free world than we normally command. We are often caught in circumstances where our only available riposte is so disproportionate to the immediate provocation that its use risks unwanted escalation or serious political costs to the free community. This asymmetry makes it attractive for Communists to apply limited debilitating pressures upon us in situations where we find it difficult to impose on them an equivalent price for their intrusions. The administration's desire to reduce its dependence on nuclear weapons did not, however, imply any corresponding determination to cut back on either their number or variety. "Nuclear and non-nuclear power complement each other," Robert McNamara insisted in 1962, "Just as together they complement the non-military instruments of policy". Once Kennedy was killed, there was an era of make-believe in the Pentagon. Vietnam was starting for real, and the constant deployment of U.S. troops against Communist forces added a new element to our national security equation. Vietnam stands testament that the atomic bomb is a tactically useless weapon that aids an attacking nation in no way tangible way. Perhaps simply possessing the bomb is a psychological advantange over the enemy, but the effects of this in Vietnam will nil. Later, Henry Kissenger would point out that in no crisis since 1962 had the strategic balance determined the outcome. There is no easy answer that best explains the Johnson administration's inability to come up with alternatives in Vietnam. Whatever the answer, we can say with relative confidence that it had nothing to do with nuclear weapons. Kissenged has pinpointed the reason early in the war: "Nuclear weapons, given the constraints on their use in an approaching era of parity, were of decreasing practical utility. Around this time, we can conclude that the world has entered an a...
